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GOPHER OIL CO. v. BUNKER DID THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
MAKE THE "RIPE" DECISION OR DID IT DIG
ITSELF INTO A HOLE WHEN RULING ON
CERCLA?
I. INTRODUCrION
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 1 in response
to concerns about the danger to public health presented by hazard-
ous waste sites and the slow reaction by the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) in solving the problem.2 In order
to facilitate the cleanup process under CERCLA, Congress empow-
ered EPA first to engage in remedial and removal actions and later
impose liability upon the responsible party.3 To further this goal,
courts have consistently held that when judicial review will delay
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCIA), Pub L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)), as reauthorized and amended by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)). The purpose of CERCIA is
"'to address the increasing environmental and health problems associated with
inactive hazardous waste sites' by ensuring that the responsible parties are held
accountable for the environmental clean-up costs." John M. Brown, Comment,
Parent Corporation's Liability Under CERCLA Section 107 For The Environmental Viola-
tions Of Their Subsidiaries, 31 TULSA LJ. 819 (1996) (citing Nurad, Inc. v. William
E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir. 1992)). Furthermore, CERCLA
is a remedial statute that operates to rectify environmental problems posed by haz-
ardous waste in the past, rather than operating prospectively to prevent future
problems. Id.
2. Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1985). Con-
gress wanted the parties responsible for the hazardous conditions to perform the
cleanup measures. See id. Because cooperation is often difficult or impossible to
obtain, however, Congress empowered the EPA to take cleanup action when neces-
sary. See id.; see also Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380,
1386 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 in recognition of
threat that hazardous wastes pose to human health and environment); Carter Day
Indus., Inc. v. EPA (In re Combustion Equip. Assoc.), 838 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir.
1988) (stating goal of CERCLA is to dean up toxic waste sites promptly and hold
those responsible for pollution liable).
3. See CERCILA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). CERCLA section 107
provides, in pertinent part, that the responsible party "shall be liable for... all
costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government
.... " Id. For the exact text of this section see infra note 38. See also JOHN C.
CaUDEN, CERCLA OvERviEw, SAS5 AIU-ABA 517, 532 (1996) (stating that recover-
able costs include government's past response costs, costs of any remediation paid
for by government, prejudgment interest, enforcement costs, and future costs at
site that government may incur).
(555)
1
Cessante: Gopher Oil Co. v. Bunker: Did the Eighth Circuit Make the Ripe De
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
556 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. VIII: p. 555
remedial and removal cleanup activities, courts are barred from re-
viewing challenges to EPA actions.4 Thus, in 1986, Congress
amended CERCLA to include section 113(h) which codified earlier
case law on the pre-enforcement review of remedial and removal
actions, thereby effectively precluding judicial review of such ac-
tions except in limited circumstances.5
In Gopher Oil Co. v. Bunker,6 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit relied on section 113(h) in concluding that
the appellant's declaratory judgment action was ripe for adjudica-
tion.7 The Gopher Oil court stated that because EPA initiated a cost-
recovery action pursuant to CERCLA section 107, the suit to deter-
mine liability between the parties was ripe.8 While the Eighth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of section 113(h) was correct, it erroneously
applied this section to the circumstances in Gopher OiL9 Thus,
although the Eighth Circuit properly ruled that the appellant's
4. See, e.g., Voluntaiy Purchasing, 889 F.2d at 1386; Barnes v. United States
Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Wash., 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986) (issuing order di-
recting district court to dismiss case because CERCLA "does not authorize pre-
enforcement review of [EPA] orders"); Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310,
315 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that when plaintiff sought preliminary injunction
against EPA order either to cleanup site or pay penalties, district court lacked juris-
diction to consider appropriateness of plaintiffs defense); Wheaton Indus. v. EPA,
781 F.2d 354, 357 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that "CERCLA precludes judicial review
of the EPA's actions in connection with remedying and cleaning up hazardous
waste sites until the EPA brings suit for the costs incurred."); Lone Pine 777 F.2d at
886-87 (stating that " It] he statutory approach to the problem of hazardous waste is
inconsistent with the delay that would accompany pre-enforcement review").
5. See Voluntayy Purchasing, 889 F.2d at 1387-88. Cases since the 1986 amend-
ments have recognized Congress's "intent to preclude review in relation to re-
moval and remedial actions except in the limited circumstances described in
section 113(h)." Id.; see also Karla A. Raettig, Comment, Wen Plain Language May
Not Be Plain: Whether CERCLA 's Preclusion Of Pre-EnforcementJudicial Review Is Limited
To Actions Under CERCLA, 26 ENvrL. L. 1049, 1050 (1996) (finding Congress added
section 113(h) to limit federal jurisdiction over challenges to CERCLA response
actions to ensure that cleanups were not needlessly delayed by court action);
Cruden, supra note 3, at 545 (stating section 113(h) bars pre-implementation and
pre-enforcement challenges to removal and remedial actions under CERCLA).
6. 84 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 1996).
7. See id. at 1051. CERCLA section 113(h) provides that federal court jurisdic-
tion to review any challenges of remedial or removal actions is limited to five spe-
cific instances, one of which includes, "an action under section 9607 of [CERCLA]
to recover of response costs or damages or contribution .... " Id. at 113(h), 42
U.S.C. § 9613(h). The Eighth Circuit also concluded that the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel barred the relitigation of the plaintiff's indemnity claim, because an
earlier state court judgment determined the claim adversely to plaintiff. See Gopher
Oi4 84 F.3d at 1051-52. For the full text of this section, see infra notes 35-44 and
accompanying text.
8. See id. CERCLA section 107 provides, in pertinent part, that all "covered
parties" shall be liable for: (1) "all costs of removal or remedial action by the
United States Government. .. ." CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
9. See Gopher Oil 84 F.3d at 1051.
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claim was ripe, its analysis in making this determination was incor-
rect because it violated precedent and was inconsistent with the De-
claratory Judgment Act (DJA).10
Part H of this Note sets forth the factual and procedural history
of Gopher OiL Part III then examines the relevant statutes and
case law pertaining to Gopher 0i focusing primarily on CERCLA
section 113(h), the application of the DJA, and the doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel. 1 Next, Part IV sets forth the Eighth Circuit's anal-
ysis in Gopher OiL0 3 Subsequently, Part V discusses the Gopher Oil
court's decision in light of the relevant case law and statutory provi-
sions, concentrating both on the court's holding that the appel-
lant's claim was ripe and its ruling that appellant's claim was barred
by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.14 Finally, Part VI focuses on
the potentially negative impact that the Gopher Oil court's decision
will have on private parties seeking a cause of action to determine
CERCLA liability.15
II. FACTS
In Gopher Oil Co. v. Bunker, Gopher Oil Company (Gopher Oil)
brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that
the Germaine Romness Estate (Estate) was liable for a release of
hazardous substances under CERCILA, the Minnesota Environmen-
tal Response and Liability Act (MERLA),16 and Minnesota common
10. See id. For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's analysis as compared to
other case law, see infra notes 129-166 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of Gopher Oil, see infra
notes 16-34 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of these authorities and doctrines, see infra notes 36-107
and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the analysis employed by the Gopher Oil court, see infra
notes 108-128 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's holding as it compares to other
case law and statutory provisions, see infra notes 130-166 and accompanying text.
15. For the impact of the Eighth Circuit's decision, see infra notes 167-172
and accompanying text.
16. Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act (MERLA), MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 115B.01-115B.24 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996). The Minnesota Legis-
lature enacted MERIA in 1983 in response to the growing concern over the effects
of environmental contamination. See Alan C. Williams, A Legislative History of the
Minnesota "Superfund" Ac 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 851, 852-53 (1984). The
legislature modeled MERIA after CERCLA and stated that its primary purposes
were to: (1) impose strict liability on those responsible for the harm caused by the
release of hazardous substances; (2) allow the state to clean up contamination and
collect costs later; and (3) fund state cleanup activity. See id. at 856-58. Moreover,
MERLA was amended in 1988 to create the first state voluntary cleanup program.
See Mark D. Anderson, The State Voluntary Cleanup Program Alternativ 10-NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T 22, 23 (Winter 1996). These amendments were enacted in
3
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law principles of tort and contract law.17 Gopher Oil instituted this
action after EPA determined that a hazardous substance was re-
leased at the Brooklyn Park dump site and that Gopher Oil was a
potentially responsible party (PRP) for such release.1 8 After mak-
ing this determination, EPA demanded reimbursement for the en-
tire cost of the cleanup at the dump site from ten PRPs, including
Gopher Oil.19 Subsequently, Gopher Oil sought a declaration that
the Estate, a predecessor corporation owned by Germaine Rom-
ness, caused the release of the hazardous substances when it owned
and operated the Brooklyn Park dump site and, therefore, was lia-
ble for the monies that EPA demanded.20
Prior to this action, Bellaire Sanitation, Inc. (Bellaire) com-
menced an action in a Minnesota state court against Gopher Oil
under MERLA and the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act
(MERA) 21 claiming that Gopher Oil was liable as a successor corpo-
ration for the hazardous wastes that Gopher State Oil Company
(Gopher State) deposited at a site that Bellaire occupied.2 The
response to the backlog of contaminated sites that developed since the passage of
MERLA in the mid-1980s. See id. Furthermore, MERLA is broader than CERCLA
in that it provides a cause of action for the recovery of damages for both personal
injury and economic losses caused by the release of hazardous chemicals into the
environment. See Williams, supra, at 852-53.
17. See Gopher Oil v. Bunker, 84 F.3d 1047, 1048 (8th Cir. 1996).
18. See id. at 1049. In January 1994, EPA notified the PRPs that it expended
over $1,373,000 in response costs to cleanup the hazardous substances at the
Brooklyn Park site. See id
19. See id. A representative from EPA informed Gopher Oil that EPA antici-
pated referring this matter to the Department of Justice and expected a CERCLA
lawsuit to be brought in the first quarter of 1995. See id.
20. See id. In September 1994, Gopher Oil brought this action, alleging that
the release of hazardous substances occurred in the 1960s when the Brooklyn Park
dump site was owned by Gopher State Oil Company (Gopher State) whose sole
shareholders were Charles and Germaine Romness. See id. In 1973, Bame Oil,
which later became Gopher Oil, acquired Gopher State from the Romnesses
through a stock acquisition. See id. As part of the stock acquisition, the Romnesses
agreed to indemnify Bame Oil for any of Gopher State's liabilities existing at clos-
ing. See id Bame Oil then distributed Gopher State's assets to itself, assuming all
liabilities, known or unknown and changed its name to Gopher Oil. See id. Some-
time after the acquisition, the Romnesses both died and the Germaine Romness
estate remained open pending the outcome of Gopher Oil's claim against the Es-
tate. See id.
21. Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA), MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 116B (West 1987 & Supp. 1997).
22. See Gopher Oi4 84 F.3d at 1049. See State v. Gopher Oil Co., Nos. C1-95-
738, C2-95-733, 1995 WL 687688 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 1995). Bellaire oper-
ated a landfill in Stillwater, Minnesota beginning in the 1950s. See id. at *1. In the
mid 1960s, Gopher State disposed of hazardous wastes on property now owned by
Shirley Johnson and leased to Bellaire. See id. Under MERLA, both Bellaire and
Gopher State were "responsible parties" in that they were strictly and jointly and
severally liable, for cleanup costs. See id, As a result of this holding, Bellaire com-
4
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Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
granting Bellaire's motion for partial summary judgment, conclud-
ing that Gopher Oil was liable as a successor corporation for the
acts of Gopher State.23 In the same cause of action, Gopher Oil
brought a third-party complaint against the Estate, one of Gopher
State's prior owners, alleging that Gopher State must indemnify Go-
pher Oil for any environmental liability.2 4 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Gopher Oil's com-
plaint on the grounds that the Estate's agreement to indemnify Go-
pher Oil did not contemplate liability under environmental statutes
menced an action against Gopher Oil seeking recovery of the cleanup costs it had
already incurred and seeking declaratory relief regarding future cleanup costs. See
id. The trial court granted Bellaire's motion for partial summary judgment, con-
duding that Gopher Oil was a successor corporation to Gopher State. See id. at *2.
The jury then returned a verdict allocating 97% of the cleanup costs to Bame Oil
and awarded only some of Bellaire's requested cleanup costs. See id. After this
judgment was entered, Gopher Oil appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court
erred in concluding that it was liable as a corporate successor for Bame Oil's clean-
up costs. See id.
23. See id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals stated that successor corporations
may be held liable for actions of a transferor corporation in the following
situations:
where one corporation sells or otherwise transfers all of its assets to an-
other corporation, the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities of
the transteror, except: (1) where the purchaser expressly or impliedly
agrees to assume such debts; (2) where the transaction amounts to a con-
solidation or merger of the corporation; (3) where the purchasing corpo-
ration is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; and (4) where
the transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for
such debts.
Id. at *2-3 (quoting J.F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Myers, 206 N.W.2d 365, 368-69
(Minn. 1973)).
The court of appeals' conclusion that Gopher Oil was a successor corporation was
supported by Bame Oil's express agreement. See id. at *3. Moreover, the court of
appeals noted that Bame Oil retained Gopher State Oil Company's employees and
continued its business of distributing oils, greases, and allied products which indi-
cated that Bame Oil and Gopher State Oil Company had effected a defacto merger.
See id.
24. See State v. Gopher Oil, Co., No. C8-94-225, 1994 WL 328631, *1 (Minn.
Ct. App. July 12, 1994). The debated contractual provision reads as follows:
[a]l liabilities of the Company of any nature, whether accrued, absolute,
contingent, or otherwise, existing at closing, to the extent not reflected or
reserved against in full in the Company's financial statements or other-
wise mentioned or expected herein, . . . arising out of transactions en-
tered into, or any state of facts existing prior to such date.
Id. (emphasis added). After reviewing this language, the trial court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of Gopher Oil's third-party complaint from which Gopher
Oil appealed. See id. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals stated that the
parties agreed that the indemnity agreement's language was plain, however, they
disagreed as to its interpretation. See id Thus, the appellate court stated that
determining the issue of whether a contract is ambiguous is a legal question that
requires a court to make an independent review of the record in light of relevant
law. See id.
5
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subsequently enacted, thus precluding Gopher Oil's indemnifica-
tion claim.25
After the Court of Appeals of Minnesota dismissed Gopher
Oil's complaint in the Bellaire-Gopher Oil case, Gopher Oil
brought the aforementioned declaratory judgment action against
the Estate in federal court.2 6 Gopher Oil's complaint consisted of
four claims: (1) a declaration that the Estate was a responsible party
under CERCLA to the extent of Gopher Oil's CERCLA liability; (2)
a declaration that the Estate was a responsible party under MERLA
to the extent of Gopher Oil's MERLA liability; (3) a declaration
that the Estate had primary tort liability to the extent of Gopher
Oil's liability to EPA or any other party because the Romnesses were
the owners of the dump site at the time of the violation; and (4) a
declaration that Gopher Oil was entitled to indemnity based on the
indemnity agreement executed by the Estate in 1973 when Bame
Oil acquired Gopher State.27
The District Court for the District of Minnesota granted the
Estate's motion to dismiss all four counts of Gopher Oil's complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the
claims were not ripe because there was no "actual controversy" as
required by the DJA.28 Alternatively, the district court granted par-
tial summary judgment in favor of the Estate on the grounds that
the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the MERLA claim, the
tort claim, and the indemnity claim due to the prior litigation in
25. Id. The court of appeals concluded that when Gopher Oil and Gopher
State Oil Company entered into the agreement in 1973, neither party contem-
plated liability arising under environmental laws enacted ten years after the agree-
ment was executed. Id. Prior to the appellate court decision, the trial court
dismissed Gopher Oil's complaint due to the limitation periods set forth in the
probate code. Gopher Oi4 84 F.3d at 1049.
26. See id. The state court litigation involved a dump site near Stillwater, Min-
nesota, while the federal court litigation involved a dump site in Brooklyn Park,
Minnesota. Id.
27. See id. This declaratory judgment action involved the same parties, the
same indemnification agreement, and most of the same claims as the third-party
complaint litigated in the Minnesota state court. Id. For the exact language of the
indemnity provision, see supra note 25.
28. See Gopher Oi4 84 F.3d at 1049-50. The district court held that "the mere
possibility of being named a defendant as responsible party does not constitute the
actual controversy which is required." Id. at 1050. The district court further noted
that the EPA may decline to sue Gopher Oil or any other of the PRPs for any
number of reasons, thereby making the case too speculative. See id. The district
court also stated that had Gopher Oil been sued it would be a different issue, but
at present time there was no requisite immediacy, nor was there any hardship to
Gopher Oil in withholding consideration. See id.
6
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the state court.2 From this judgment, Gopher Oil appealed the
dismissal of its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.30
The Estate then cross appealed on the grounds that the complaint
should also have been dismissed for two reasons: (1) because Go-
pher Oil's assumption of Gopher State's liabilities barred the
claims, and (2) the complaint failed to state a cause of action under
CERCLA, MERLA or principles of contractual indemnity.31
After oral argument before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, the court received notice that on March 25,
1996, EPA had filed a CERCLA cost-recovery suit against Gopher
Oil and four other PRPs.32 Pursuant to EPA's lawsuit, the Eighth
Circuit reversed the dismissal of Gopher Oil's CERCLA claim and
remanded it for further consideration.33 The Eighth Circuit also
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the MERLA claim and the
tort claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment on the indemnity agree-
ment claim.34
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Statute-The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA to preclude pre-enforce-
ment judicial review of lawsuits challenging EPA response actions
by adding section 113(h).3 5 Under this section, federal courtjuris-
29. See id. The district court, however, explicitly declined to rule alternatively
on the CERCLA claim, because it was not litigated in the state courts. See id.
30. See id. at 1049-50.
31. See id. at 1050.
32. See id. Gopher Oil also entered into a tolling agreement with the Depart-
ment ofJustice to discuss possible settlements. See id. The primary purpose of the
tolling agreement was to facilitate discussions and possible settlement of the gov-
ernment's demand for reimbursement. See id. The Eighth Circuit noted that the
Estate was not one of the PRPs included in EPA's CERCLA claim. See id.
33. See Gopher Oi 84 F.3d at 1052. The court of appeals did not express any
view on the merits or sufficiency of Gopher Oil's CERCLA claim. See id.
34. See id. at 1050. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that the
government's threat of suit was too speculative to create an actual controversy and,
thus, the declaratory judgment claim was not ripe. See id. at 1051. The Eighth
Circuit also noted that none of the present facts indicated an immediate threat of
either MERLA or tort liability. See id.
35. See Raettig, supra note 5, at 1049. CERCLA section 113(h) bars federal
jurisdiction over challenges to ongoing cleanup actions taken under CERCLA. See
id. at 1050. Thus, subject to the five enumerated exceptions of section 113(h),
federal courts are precluded from exercisingjurisdiction over any lawsuit challeng-
ing any EPA response action until either the response action has been completed
or an enforcement action has been filed. Cruden, supra note 3 at 545.
1997]
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diction to review any challenges of remedial or removal actions is
limited to the following five specific instances:36
(1) an action under section 9607 of [CERCLA] for recov-
ery of response costs or damages or contribution;3 7 (2) an
action to enforce an order issued under section 9606(a) of
[CERCLA] or to recover a penalty for violation of such
order;38 (3) an action for reimbursement under section
36. CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1994).
37. CERCLA section 107 defines, in part, that "covered persons" for the pur-
poses of liability under CERCLA are as follows:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at
the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any per-
son who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arrarged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person,
by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous sub-
stances, and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous sub-
stances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration
vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance ....
Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
This section continues, stating that the "covered parties" shall be liable for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the na-
tional contingency plan; (B) any other necessary costs or response in-
curred by any other person consistent with the national contingency
plan; (C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruc-
tion, or loss resulting from such a release; and (D) the costs of any health
assessment or health effects study carried out under section 9604(1) of
[CERCLA] ....
Id. § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
For CERCILA purposes, the term "owner" or "operator" means:
(i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by
demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore
facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case
of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy,
foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of
State or local government, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise
controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand. Such term
does not include a person, who, without participating in the management
of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his
security interest in the vessel or facility.
Id. § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601.
38. CERCLA section 106(a), entitled "Abatement actions," states that:
[i]n addition to any other action taken by a State or local government,
when the President determines that there may be an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment
because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from
a facility, he may require the Attorney General of the United States to
secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat, and
8
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9606(b) (2) of [CERCLA];3 9 (4) an action under section
965940 of [CERCLA] (relating to citizen suits) alleging
that the removal or remedial action taken under section
960441 of [CERCLA] or secured under section 960642 of
[CERCLA] was in violation of any requirement of [chap-
ter 9613 of CERCLA]. Such an action may not be brought
with regard to a removal where a remedial action is to be
undertaken at the site43; (5) an action under section 9606
the district court of the United States in the district in which the threat
occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the public interest
and the equities of the case may require. The President may also, after
notice to the affected State, take other action under this section includ-
ing, but not limited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary to protect
public health and welfare and the environment.
CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
39. Under CERCLA section 106(b) (2) (A), "[a]ny person who receives and
complies with the terms of any order issued under subsection (a) may, within 60
days after completion of the required action, petition the President for reimburse-
ment from the Fund for the reasonable costs of such action, plus interest...." Id.
§ 106(b) (2) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (2) (A). Under section 9606(b) (2) (B), "[i]f
the President refused to grant all or part of a petition made under [section 9606],
the petitioner may within 30 days of receipt of such refusal file an action against
the President in the appropriate United States district court seeking reimburse-
ment from the Fund." CERCLA § 106(b) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (2) (B).
Under section 106(b) (2) (D), "[a] petitioner who is liable for response costs ...
may also recover its reasonable costs of response to the extent that it can demon-
strate... that the President's decision in selecting the response action ordered was
arbitrary and capricious or was otherwise not in accordance with law." Id.
§ 106(b) (2) (D), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (2) (D).
40. Section 310 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[e]xcept as provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this section and in
section 113(h) [42 U.S.C.S. § 9613(h)] ... any person may commence a
civil action on his own behalf-(1) against any person (including the
United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to
the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution)
who is alleged to be in violation of any standard, regulation, condition,
requirement, or order which has become effective pursuant to this Act
... ; or (2) against the President or any other officer of the United States
(including the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency...
) where there is alleged a failure of the President or of such other officer
to perform any act or duty under this Act ....
Id, § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659.
41. Section 104 provides that the President may direct removal or remedial
actions to be taken whenever any hazardous substances are released or there is a
substantial threat of a release. Id. § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604. Under this section, the
President's authority allows him to:
remove or arrange for the removal of [hazardous substances], and pro-
vide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant,
or contaminant at any time .. ., or take any other response measure con-
sistent with the national contingency plan which the President deems
necessary to protect public health or welfare of the environment.
Id. § 104(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
42. For the language of this section, see supra notes 39-40.
43. CERCLA section 101(23) defines "removal" as:
9
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of [CERCLA] in which the United States has moved to
compel a remedial action.
Furthermore, CERCLA section 113(f) provides that "[a]ny person
may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or po-
tentially liable under 9607(a) of [CERCLA], during or following
any civil action under section 9606 of [CERCLA] or under section
9607(a) of [CERCLA]." 44
The legislative history of CERCLA indicates that "delay will
often exacerbate an already serious situation [and that] it is prefer-
able to err on the side of protecting public health, welfare and the
environment in administering the response authority of the
fund."45 Senator Thurmond also stated that "citizens, including po-
tentially responsible parties, cannot seek review of the response action
or their potential liability for a response action-unless the suit falls
within one of the categories provided in section [113] ."46 In a simi-
lar report, Representative Glickman stated that "[section 113] also
covers all issues that could be construed as a challenge to the re-
sponse and limits those challenges to the opportunities specifically
set forth in this section."47
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the envi-
ronment, such actions as may be necessary [sic] taken in the event of the
threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such ac-
tions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or
threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed mate-
rial, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent,
minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the
environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of re-
lease ....
Id. § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). CERCILA section 101 defines "remedial ac-
tion" as:
those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in
addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize
the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause
substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the
environment ....
Id. at § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). This section also goes on to list several
specific methods that the EPA may use to effectuate the removal action. See id.
44. Id § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). For the textual language of CERCIA
section 106, see supra note 39. For the textual language of CERCLA section
107(a), see supra note 37.
45. S. REP. No. 848, at 56 (1980), reprinted in A LEGIsLATIW HISTORY OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABIxIY Acr OF
1980 at 363.
46. 132 CONG. REc. § 14929 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (emphasis added). Sena-
tor Thurmond further stated that section 113(h) "is designed to preclude piece-
meal review and excessive delay of cleanup." Id. at 14928.
47. 132 CONG. REC. H9582 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986).
10
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B. The Case Law-Ripeness and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
under CERCLA and the DJA
Under the DJA, there must be an "actual controversy" in order
for the court to exercise jurisdiction.48 An actual controversy exists
when "there is a substantial controversy between parties having ad-
verse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant
the issuance of a declaratory judgment."49 Once an actual contro-
versy exists, the court "may declare the rights and other legal rela-
tions of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or
not further relief is or could be sought."5 Moreover, in Carter Day
Industries v. EPA (In re Combustion Equipment Associates),5 1 the Second
Circuit held that there are two factors to consider when determin-
ing whether a declaratory judgment action exists: (1) the fitness of
the matter for judicial decision; and (2) the hardship to the parties
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994). This section of the DJA states that, "[i]n a case
of actual controversy... any court of the United States... may declare the rights
and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether
or not further relief is or could be sought." Id.
49. See Caldwell v. Gurley Ref. Co., 755 F.2d 645, 649 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941), quoting
Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 506 (1972)). In CaldweU, the EPA
notified both the lessor and lessee that there was an oil spill for which one or both
of the parties would be liable for cleanup costs. See id. at 650. Subsequently, EPA
cleaned up the contaminated site and the lessor filed a declaratory judgment
against the lessee seeking a determination that the lessee was liable for the cleanup
costs. See id. at 649-50. After the suit was filed, but before trial, the Coast Guard
notified both parties that it would hold a hearing to assess the penalties and costs
of the cleanup and that one or both of the parties would be liable for such costs.
See id. at 650. Based on these facts, the Eighth Circuit determined that there was "a
live dispute" between the parties at the time the suit was fied thereby creating an
"actual controversy." See id. The Caldwell court stated that an analogous situation
is presented in those cases in which the government threatens to enforce their
rules and challenges are made to the government's authority. See id. In these
cases, the plaintiff does not always have to wait for the actual commencement of
enforcement proceedings to challenge the questioned authority under which the
proceedings would be brought. See id. The Eighth Circuit noted, however, that
"for such an action to present a justiciable controversy, the threat of enforcement
must have immediate coercive consequences of some sort upon the plaintiff." Id.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The specific language of this section provides that "[in
the case of an actual controversy within its jurisdiction... a court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or
not further relief is or could be sought." Id.
51. 838 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1988).
11
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of withholding court consideration. 52 Several cases illustrate how
the courts have applied these rules to various factual situations. 53
In Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc.,54 the Ninth Circuit
held that a successor owner's claim against a previous owner to de-
termine liability under CERCLA was ripe even though EPA had not
filed an action against either party.55 In reaching this conclusion,
52. See id. at 38. (citing Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).
Among the factors used to determine whether a matter is fit for judicial decision
are: (1) whether the agency action is "final;" and (2) whether the issue is purely
legal or whether "consideration of the underlying legal issues would necessarily be
facilitated if they were raised in the context of a specific attempt to enforce the
regulations." I. at 37-38 (quoting Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assoc., 387 U.S. 167,
171 (1967)). The Second Circuit further stated that these factors are to be ana-
lyzed in conjunction with the premise that "the purpose of the [DeclaratoryJudg-
ment] Act is to enable parties to adjudicate disputes before either side suffers great
damage." Id. at 37.
In Carter Day, the plaintiff, in 1980, filed for voluntary reorganization under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See id. at 36. In 1981, one of the plaintiffi's
subsidiaries filed for liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. See id.
At the liquidation proceedings, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Pro-
tection (NJDEP) filed a claim against the subsidiary to recover costs and penalties
related to the contamination of two landfills by the subsidiary. See id.
In 1983, EPA notified the plaintiff that it was a PRP for the cleanup of both of
the sites that its subsidiary contaminated. See id. Subsequently, EPA, pursuant to
CERCIA, funded a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study to develop a
cleanup strategy at the sites. See id. EPA did not file any claims against plainiff at
this time. See id
In 1986, however, EPA filed a claim against the plaintiff's subsidiary at the
bankruptcy proceedings. See id. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff began an adver-
sary proceeding in United States Bankruptcy Court, seeking a declaration that any
CERCIA liability it may have had for the contaminated sites was discharged by its
Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization. See id. The trial court dismissed the com-
plaint on the grounds the that the suit was not ripe and plaintiff appealed. See id.
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff's request for dedaratoryjudg-
ment was not ripe for review because the plaintiff was only named as a PRP and
because EPA did not file a claim against the plaintiff. See id. The Second Circuit
also stated that "the potentially responsible party letter was not a final, definitive
ruling with the status of a law demanding immediate compliance since it imposed
no liability on plaintiff." Id. at 38.
53. For a discussion of these decisions, see infra notes 55-94 and accompany-
ing text.
54. 792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986).
55. See id. at 893. In Widkand Oi, Asarco Inc. (Asarco) operated a smelting
operation from 1886 to 1970 on a parcel of land (Parcel) that was later purchased
by Wickland Oil Terminals (Wickland) in 1977. See id at 889. In 1980, the Califor-
nia Department of Health Services (Department) notified Wickland that the Par-
cel was contaminated by hazardous waste and that Wickland was responsible for
the cleanup of the Parcel. See id. Consequently, Wickland expended approxi-
mately $150,000 in cleanup efforts and tests. See id. Subsequently, Wickland
brought suit in district court against Asarco under CERCLA. See id. Wickland's
complaint requested the following: (1) damages under CERCLA section 107(a)
for testing costs incurred; (2) a declaration that Asarco, rather than Wickland, was
solely and entirely liable under CERCLA for any release of hazardous substances at
the Parcel; and (3) an order requiring Asarco to initiate clean-up of the Parcel. See
12
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the Ninth Circuit followed the proposition that "a case is ripe where
the essential facts establishing the right to declaratory relief have
already occurred."56 In NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan,5 7 the Ninth
Circuit followed Wickland Oil in holding that CERCLA creates a pri-
vate cause of action for damages.58 Thus, the NL Industries court
allowed the plaintiff to sue the defendant for reimbursement of the
id. The district court granted Asarco's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. See id. Specifically, the district court ruled
that "'an authorized governmental cleanup program, initiated by the EPA or by
state authorities pursuant to a cooperative agreement, must commence before a
private party can state a claim for damages under CERCIA'" Id, at 890 (quoting
Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 72, 77 (N.D. Cal. 1984)).
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling, stating that the absence
of EPA enforcement actions did not render Wickland's CERCLA claim "remote or
hypothetical." Id. at 893. Thus, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the "essential fact
establishing Wickland's right to declaratory relief-the alleged disposal of hazard-
ous substances at the [Parcel] at the time Asarco owned and operated the smelting
facility-ha[d] already occurred." Id.
56. Id. In Arawana Mills Co. v. United Technologies Cop., 795 F. Supp. 1238,
1245-46 (D. Conn. 1992), the United States District Court for the District of Con-
necticut held that a private plaintiff's motion for adeclaratory judgment that the
defendant was liable for cleanup and future costs was ripe. The Arawana court
stated that ripeness "controls only those cases in which the EPA has engaged in
enforcement action under CERCLA and one of the [PRPs] which the EPA has
identified files a suit asking for a declaratory judgment that it is not liable." See ia
at 1242. Furthermore, in AlUed Princess Bay Co. v. Atochem North America, Inc., 855 F.
Supp. 595, 602-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), the District Court for the Eastern District of
New York stated that CERCLA specifically provides for a private cause of action
even when the extent of the response costs are uncertain, remediation has yet to
occur, and the plaintiff is not yet under any government order compelling
remediation. The Allied Princess court went on to determine that the purchaser's
claim to the hold seller responsible for part of the response costs was ripe, and,
accordingly, the purchaser could pursue a declaratory judgment that the seller was
liable as a responsible party. See id.
57. 792 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1986).
58. See id. at 898. The Ninth Circuit cited CERCLA section 107 in coming to
this conclusion. See id. For the text of this section, see supra note 37.
In NL Industries, plaintiff acquired a parcel of land which it later found to be
severely contaminated with hazardous substances. See id. at 897. As a result of the
contamination, state and local officials from California required the plaintiff to
expend $1,200,000 to dispose of the hazardous substances. See id. Prior to the
plaintiff's purchase of the contaminated land, the defendant owned the property
for over 70 years and used it to operate facilities for paint and varnish products.
See id. After the plaintiff cleaned up the site, it sued the defendant under CERCLA
section 107(a) to recover its cleanup expenditures. See id. The plaintiff alleged
that during the defendant's ownership of the contaminated site the defendant de-
posited the hazardous substances which contaminated the land. See id. at 898.
ubsequently, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, but the district court denied the motion and
defendant appealed. See id. at 898-99. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding, and cited its earlier decision in Wickland Oil as authority for its
conclusion. See id. at 899.
1997] BUNIKER 567
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recovery costs it expended during the cleanup of a contaminated
site.59
Similarly, in Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 60 the District Court for
the Western District of Michigan held that CERCLA section 107(a)
gives a responsible, or potentially responsible party a private right
of action against owners and operators for response costs. 61 Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court has noted that CERCLA section 107 "un-
questionably provides a cause of action for private parties to seek
recovery of cleanup costs .... "62
59. See id. The Ninth Circuit allowed the plaintiff to maintain its private cause
of action even though the plaintiff incurred its cleanup costs without acting pursu-
ant to a cleanup program approved by a "lead agency". See id. at 899. "Lead
agency," as used in this case, referred to "the EPA or a state agency operating
pursuant to a contract or cooperative agreement executed under CERCIA." Wick-
land Oil, 792 F.2d at 891. The NL Industries court adopted the same definition for
"lead agency" as it had declared earlier in the Wikland Oil case, thereby follwing its
earlier reasoning in Wkkdnd Oil that a governmentally authorized cleanup pro-
gram was not a precondition to maintaining a private cause of action. See id. at
898-99.
60. 790 F. Supp. 710 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
61. See id. at 717. In Kley, EPA and the state of Michigan sought recovery
under CERCLA for costs that they expended in cleaning up hazardous wastes at
Verona Well Field. See id. at 713. Prior to the cleanup, Thomas Solvent Company
(Solvent) was in business as a distributor of chemical products at two locations
including one at "the Annex." See id. at 714. The Annex was owned at all times by
Grand Trunk Western Railroad (Grand Trunk) and leased to Solvent. See id. Ad-
ditionally, Grand Trunk owned a third property which was used as its marshalling
yard. See id.
Because it was not possible to determine the precise source of contamination
at the Verona Well Field, each of the three sites were determined to be potential
sources of the contamination. See id. After both parties were found liable to EPA
for the cleanup costs, they filed motions seeking reimbursement under CERCLA.
See id. at 713. Solvent also sought reimbursement from Grand Trunk for the re-
sponse costs it expended to cleanup the Verona Well Field. See id. at 715. Grand
Trunk argued, however, that Thomas Solvent was liable for the response costs that
Grand Trunk expended to cleanup the Annex and the Verona Well Field. See id.
The Kelley court began its analysis of each party's claim by examining whether
CERCILA permitted a private cause of action for reimbursement under section
107(a). See id. at 717. In concluding that such an action was available, the Kdey
court stated that "potentially responsible and responsible parties have standing to
seek reimbursement for their response costs under section [1107(a) [as it] sup-
ports the underlying policy of encouraging prompt and complete response actions
to this extremely dangerous contamination." Id. Thus, the Kelley court stated that
allowing a private cause of action against owners and operators "encourages subse-
quent owners and occupiers to take prompt response actions when hazardous con-
tamination is discovered and thus, minimizes harm." Id.
62. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994). The
Supreme Court further noted that although CERCLA did not contain any express
provisions authorizing a private party that incurred cleanup costs to seek contribu-
tion from other potentially responsible parties, several courts recognized section
107 to impliedly authorize such a cause of action. See id. at 813. Additionally, the
Supreme Court noted that Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 by adding section
113(f) which created an express cause of action for contribution. See id, at 814.
14
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Moreover, in GNB Battery Technologies, Inc. v. Goul4 Inc.,6s the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
when a declaratory judgment plaintiff filed "an action in anticipa-
tion of a threatened action by [a] declaratory judgment defendant,
the real and immediate possibility of ... litigation [was] sufficient
to create ajusticiable controversy."64 In coming to this conclusion,
the Seventh Circuit stated "[t] he test to be applied to determine the
existence of an actual controversy in the context of a declaratory
judgment action is 'whether... there is a substantial controversy,
between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immedi-
acy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judg-
ment'-35 While courts have held that private causes of action for
Thus, the court stated that CERCLA contained both an express cause of action for
contribution in section 113 and "impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat over-
lapping remedy in [section] 107." Id.
63. 65 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 1995).
64. Id. at 620. In GNB Battery, Gould, a publicly-held corporation involved in
the business of the manufacture, sale and reclamation of batteries, formed a
wholly-owned subsidiary, GNB Batteries, Inc., (GNB Batteries) to facilitate the fu-
ture sale of Gould's battery business. See id. at 618. Gould then transferred the
business and assets of its battery business to GNB Batteries and subsequently of-
fered to sell all of the stock of GNB Batteries. See id. Subsequently, Stanley Gaines,
one of Gould's senior vice-presidents, formed GNB Acquisition Corp. (Acquisi-
tion) for the purpose of purchasing GNB Batteries. See id.
Prior to the sale of GNB Batteries to Acquisition, Gould executed a Restated
Assumption Agreement with GNB Batteries in which GNB Batteries agreed to as-
sume "any and all obligations and liabilities of any nature... of Gould relating to
the businesses and operations of the [Battery] Divisions incurred by Gould ...
prior to [April 6, 1984] .... " Id. Pursuant to the sale, Acquisition merged with
GNB Batteries and became GNB Battery Technologies, Inc. (GNB). See id, Five to
six years after this sale, serious environmental problems relating to the battery
business surfaced. See id.
As a result of potential liability under CERCLA, GNB filed a two-count declar-
atory judgment action against Gould based on the contention that GNB was not
responsible for environmental liabilities that arose at Gould's plants prior to the
sale in 1984. See id. The first count requested a declaration that "GNB [was] not a
potentially responsible party under Section 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607,
for the hazardous waste disposed of by Gould at its battery manufacturing facilities
not acquired by GNB or by Gould at common facilities." Id. The second count
sought a declaration that "[u]nder the Restated Assumption Agreement, GNB did
not undertake responsibility for Gould's liability for environmental cleanups or
damages for any Gould properties or manufacturing facilities . . . [or] . . . for
common facilities." Id. Gould counterclaimed, and sought declarations that: (1)
GNB was liable to Gould under CERCLA,; and (2) GNB was responsible under the
Restated Assumption Agreement for Gould's environmental liabilities complaint.
See id. at 618-19. The district court concluded that the Restated Assumption Agree-
ment "unambiguously transferred the disputed environmental liabilities to GNB."
Id at 619.
65. Id. at 620 (quoting Nuclear Engage Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241, 251-52 (7th
Cir. 1981)). The Seventh Circuit determined that under the totality of circum-
stances, GNB sufficiently alleged that Gould sought to impose CERCLA liability on
it, thus creating an actual controversy to warrant jurisdiction. See id. at 621. In
15
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reimbursement and contribution under CERCLA are ripe and per-
missible, courts have also uniformly held that section 113(h) of
CERCLA prevents courts from exercising jurisdiction over appeals
to certain EPA actions, thereby making these claims unripe.6
In McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry,67 the Ninth Cir-
cuit stated that the prohibitory language of section 113(h) divests
federal courts of jurisdiction over any challenges to removal or re-
medial actions under CERCLA.68 The Ninth Circuit further noted
that "[s]ection 113(h) is clear and unequivocal [and i]t amounts to
making this determination, the Seventh Circuit stated that "the question of CER-
CIA liability and the interpretation of any indemnification agreement among the
parties liable for the clean-up are inextricably related." Id. The GNB Battery court
further noted that CERCIA liability would continue to exist even if contractual
liability was determined to be non-existent. See id.
66. See McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 328 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 51 (1995) (stating prohibitory language of section
113(h) divests federal courts of jurisdiction over any challenges to removal or re-
medial actions under CERCA); Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollu-
tion Control & Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 1217 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating CERCLA
section 113(h) does not permit challenges to EPA action until after EPA has com-
pleted removal or remedial action); Wheaton Indus. v. EPA, 781 F.2d 354, 356 (3d
Cir. 1986) (stating pre-enforcement review of EPA's remedial actions contrary to
policies underlying CERCLA); Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882,
884 (3d Cir. 1985) (same).
67. 47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1994).
68. See id. at 328. McClellan involved a situation at McClellan Air Force Base,
where large amounts of hazardous wastes were disposed of and subsequently
leached into the groundwater. See id. at 327. As a result, McClellan began a
cleanup program in 1979 and later modified its cleanup plan to comply with the
requirements of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986. See
id. The amended cleanup plan set forth an agreement by which McClellan would
incorporate all of the applicable legislative rejuirements into its cleanup effort
through a Management Action Plan involving itself, EPA, the Air Force and the
state of California. See id.
Shortly thereafter, McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) brought
an action against the United States Secretary of Defense alleging that McClellan's
cleanup procedures violated RCRA, the Clean Water Act and the California Water
Code. See id. MESS sought an injunction against McClellan to prevent any further
cleanup procedures until the applicable standards were met. See id. The district
court denied MESS's claim on the grounds that McClellan's cleanup efforts were
removal and remedial actions being conducted under CERCILA See id. at 328.
Thus, the district court held that CERCLA section 113(h) barred MESS's claim.
See id.
MESS appealed, arguing that CERCLA section 113(h) did not apply because it
was merely seeking that McClellan comply with RCRA and Clean Water Act stan-
dards that McClellan was already bound to follow. See id. The Ninth Circuit re-
jected this argument, holding that "the unqualified language of [section 113(h)]
precludes 'any challenges' to CERCLA Section 104 dean-ups, not just those
brought under other provisions of CERCLA." Id. The Ninth Circuit also held that
section 113(h) withholdsjurisdiction from all claims and challenges, including citi-
zen suits. See id.
16
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a 'blunt withdrawal of federal jurisdiction.'" 69 Similarly, in Arkansas
Peace Center v. Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology,70
the Eighth Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction over an ac-
tion by citizens who sought a preliminary injunction to prevent EPA
from engaging in certain removal action activities.71 In making this
determination, the Eighth Circuit held that CERCLA section
113(h) does not permit such an action until EPA has completed
removal or remedial actions.72
Likewise, in Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly,7 the
Fifth Circuit held that "it is clear that CERCLA explicitly limits judi-
cial review of remedial and removal plans where such review will
delay cleanup." 74 In coming to this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit
69. Id. (quoting North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir.
1991)). The Ninth Circuit recognized that in some cases the application of section
113(h) may delayjudicial review, if not permanently, and may result in irreparable
harm to other important concerns. See id. The Ninth Circuit went on to say, how-
ever, that "[w]e must presume that Congress has already balanced all concerns and
'concluded that the interest in removing the hazard of toxic waste from Superfund
sites' dearly outweighs the risk of irreparable harm." Id. at 329 (quoting Boarhead
Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1023 (3rd Cir. 1991)).
70. 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993).
71. See id. at 1217. In Peace Center, several companies operated a herbicide
and pesticide production facility which eventually led to the contamination of the
surrounding area. See id. at 1213. After the site was abandoned, EPA began to
initiate immediate removal actions. See id. at 1214. Shortly after cleanup actions
began, Greenpeace and the National Toxins Campaign prepared a report criticiz-
ing EPA's removal action cleanup methods. See id, Subsequently, several groups
sued EPA, seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to
enjoin EPA from engaging in the disputed cleanup methods. See id. at 1215. EPA
filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that section 113(h) showed Congress's dear
intent that removal actions must be completed before a suit may be filed. See id, at
1216. The district court entered a temporary restraining order on the grounds
that the cleanup procedures violated EPA's procedures and, thus, presented "po-
tential irreparable harm to plaintiffs [that] outweigh[ed) the potential harm to
defendants." IM at 1215. The Eighth Circuit reversed, relying on CERCI.A section
113(h). See id at 1217.
72. See id. The Eighth Circuit relied on two cases in making this determina-
tion. See id. In Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989), the Eleventh
Circuit held that the plain language of section 113(h) bars suit until a remedial
action is actually completed. In Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit barred a citizen
group's challenge to EPA's failure to provide them with notice and hearing before
it chose the method of remedial action. See id. at 1554.
In Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095 (7th Cir. 1990), the Seventh Circuit
held that section 113(h) barred a citizens' challenge to a consent decree between
EPA and a responsible party for failing to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment which violated the National Environmental Policy Act. The Schalk court
stated that "challenges to the procedure employed in selecting a remedy neverthe-
less impact the implementation of the remedy and result in the same delays Con-
gress sought to avoid by passage to the statute." Id.
73. 889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1989).
74. Id. at 1388. The Fifth Circuit further stated that "after considering the
CERCLA statute, its structure, and legislative history ... '[i] n all events, the philos-
17
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relied on CERCLA section 113(h) when adopting EPA's reasoning
that a letter identifying PRPs was an "enforcement activity" not sub-
ject to judicial review.75 Moreover, in CarterDay, the Second Circuit
stated that "under CERCLA, liability is not assessed until after the
EPA has investigated a site, decided what remedial measures are
necessary, and determined which [potentially responsible parties]
will bear the costs." 7
6
However, in Manville Corp. v. United States,77 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York found that a
plaintiff's declaratory judgment action was ripe because EPA
threatened the plaintiff with enforcement or "initiated coercive set-
tlement processes."78 This decision gains little support however
when compared to the cases in the Third Circuit.79
ophy of the statute is that until the government initiates a cost-recovery action, a
potential responsible party cannot obtain judicial review of the agency action.'"
Id. (quoting B.R. MacKay & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1290, 1297 (D.
Utah 1986)).
75. See id. at 1387. Voluntary Purchasing involved a letter to a chemical manu-
facturer and other PRPs which encouraged settlement of their potential liability
for waste removal actions taken by EPA. See id. at 1382-83. The letter also gave the
PRPS a chance to coordinate payments by enclosing the names and addresses of
other allegedly responsible parties. See id. The Fifth Circuit held that this letter
was merely an enforcement activity that stemmed from a removal action that had
already taken place and any delay caused by the plaintiffs suit would interfere with
an emergency cleanup of the contaminated site. See id. at 1387. The Fifth Circuit
further stated that their holding was consistent with CERCLA's purpose of promot-
ing "'prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites [.]'" Id. at 1386 (quoting Dickerson
v. EPA, 834 F.2d 974, 978 (11th Cir. 1987) (quotingJ.V. Peters & Co., Inc. v. EPA,
767 F.2d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 1985))).
76. Carter Day Indus. v. EPA (In re Combustion Equipment Associates), 838 F.2d 35,
37 (2d Cir. 1988). For a discussion of the facts in Carter Day, see supra note 52.
The Carter Day court also stated that CERCLA's purpose is to cleanup toxic waste
sites promptly and to hold those responsible for the pollution liable. See CarterDay,
838 F.2d at 37. The Second Circuit continued, noting that Congress specifically
"amended CERCIA in 1986 to make clear that the statute precluded preenforce-
mentjudicial review." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (West Supp. 1987); H.R. REP.
No. 99-253(I), at 81 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2863).
77. 139 B.R. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
78. Id. at 107. In Manville, the plaintiff was subject to EPA action at four dif-
ferent sites. See id. The plaintiff filed a suit seeking a declaratory judgment that
EPA's claims with respect to cleanup procedures at the sites were discharged in
prior bankruptcy proceedings. See id. The Manville court found that EPA enforce-
ment activity had advanced sufficiently beyond that in Carter Day to make the plain-
tiff's hardship outweigh that to EPA and CERCI.A. See id. at 109. Thus, the
Manville court rejected EPA's argument that section 113(h) precluded the court
from exercisingjurisdiction. See id. at 103. Further, the Manville court noted that
EPA could not have been unaware of Manville's bankruptcy, and that the future of
the reorganization and the asbestos-claims fund could be threatened by Manville's
inability to secure a determination of whether it was liable under CERCLA. See id.
79. For a discussion of Third Circuit decisions which do not support the
Manville holding that a plaintiff's declaratory judgment was ripe because of EPA's
18
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In Lone Pine Steering Committee v. EPA, 80 the plaintiff, a PRP,
contended that EPA's clean-up plan was excessive compared to its
own proposed clean-up plan and, thus, the court should have juris-
diction to determine whether the plaintiff's plan was sufficient.81
The Third Circuit denied review of the clean-up plan on the prem-
ise that "CERCLA was enacted in response to concerns about the
danger to public health presented by hazardous waste sites and the
slow reaction by the EPA to solve the problem." 2 Later, in Wheaton
Industries v. EPA,83 the Third Circuit affirmed its Lone Pine decision
when it held "unequivocally that pre-enforcement review of EPA's
remedial actions was contrary to the policies underlying CER-
threats of enforcement or "coercive settlement processes," see infra notes 80-89
and accompanying text.
80. 777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985).
81. See id. at 882-84. Prior to the litigation in Lone Pine, EPA sent a letter to
142 PRPs, including the plaintiff, in response to EPA's remedying conditions at a
contaminated landfill. See id. at 883. Subsequently, EPA, in an effort to select an
appropriate cleanup action, asked 15 companies to perform a feasibility study at
the landfill. See id. After receiving no responses, plaintiff formed a committee to
develop and implement appropriate remedial action. See id. After the plaintiff
formed this committee, EPA proposed a cleanup plan to which the plaintiff took
exception, contending that it was "superfluous." Id. After several unsuccessful at-
tempts to determine a proposal acceptable to all of the parties, EPA notified each
of the PRPs that EPA was adopting its own cleanup proposal. See id. at 884. EPA
further informed the PRPs that if any party was unwilling to pay for all or part of
the cost, EPA would use federal funds to cleanup the site and then sue for reim-
bursement. See id.
After resubmitting its proposal to EPA, the plaintiff filed a declaratory judg-
ment action against EPA, alleging that EPA's "plan was too costly, the agency had
failed to evaluate adequately... [plaintiffs] proposal, and the Record of Decision
contained inaccurate technical data and erroneous assumptions resulting in dupli-
cative and unnecessary corrective measures." Id. The district court granted EPA's
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that CERL-
CLA's statutory language and legislative history illustrate that "Congress did not
contemplate pre-enforcement judicial review of EPA's decision to implement re-
sponse action." Id. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that it would be prejudiced in
a post hoc recovery action because it would be impossible at that time to show that
the response action was excessive. See id. at 885.
82. Id. at 886. The Third Circuit began with the premise that "U]udicial re-
view of final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is
persuasive reason to believe such was the purpose of Congress." Id. at 885 (quot-
ing Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)). Rather, the Third Circuit
stated that when public health is threatened, an administrative agency is permitted
to act first and litigate later. See id. Thus, the Third Circuit looked to CERCIA's
legislative history which stated that "'delay will often exacerbate an already serious
situation' and that 'it is preferable to err on the side of protecting public health,
welfare and the environment in administering the response authority of the
fund.'" Id. at 887 (quoting S. RF'. No. 96-848, at 56 (1980)). Therefore, the Lone
Pine court ruled that "[tJ o delay remedial action until the liability situation is un-
scrambled would be inconsistent with the statutory plan to promptly eliminate the
sources of danger to health and environment." Id. at 886.
83. 781 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1986).
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CLA."84 The WMeaton court further stated that "'[t]he legal ques-
tion of when judicial review is available should not depend on the
peculiar facts of each case.' "-a
Furthermore, in Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson,8 6 the Third Circuit
held that it did not have jurisdiction under CERCLA to hear a
plaintiffs challenge to EPA's pre-cleanup activities, noting that
"CERCLA's language shows Congress concluded that disputes
about who is responsible for a hazardous site, what measures actu-
ally are necessary to clean-up the site and remove the hazard or who
is responsible for its costs should be dealt with after the site has
been cleaned up."8 7 The Boarhead court stated that the plain lan-
84. Id, at 356. In Wheaton, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Pro-
tection (NJDEP) informed the plaintiff that it might be a PRP for hazardous waste
at a contaminated site. See id. at 355. After unsuccessful negotiations between the
plaintiff and the NJDEP about the design and implementation of a remedial inves-
tigation/field study at the site, the NJDEP and EPA entered into a cooperative
agreement pursuant to CERCLA section 104 whereby EPA would provide money
to the NJDEP to conduct the necessary remedial investigation or field study at the
site. See id. The plaintiff then filed a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunc-
tion action seeking to enjoin EPA from spending federal money on the contami-
nated site. See id. at 355-56.
The trial court then granted EPA's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matterjurisdiction on the premise that CERCLA does not allow judicial review before a
cost recovery action and that EPA's refusal to allow plaintiff to perform the reme-
dial investigation or field study was not a final agency action subject to judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act. See id. Subsequently, the plaintiff
appealed, arguing that Lone Pine was not controlling because the plaintiff in Lone
Pine appealed from EPA's rejection of its proposal in favor of an EPA proposal, as
distinguished from the present situation in which the plaintiff appealed from
EPA's refusal to permit the plaintiff to perform its own remedial investigation or
field study. See id. In denying this argument, the Wheaton court stated that "[i]n
each case, the plaintiff sought control of an activity that is a necessary component
of remedial actions and based the substantive claim on section 104 of CERCLA."
Id.
85. Id. Rather, the Wheaton court stated that "'[w] hether and to what extent a
particular statute precludes judicial review is determined not only from its express
laguage, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its
legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action involved.'" Id. at 357
(quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984)); see also Barnes
v. United States Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Wash., 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986)(stating that CERCLA does not authorize pre-enforcement review of EPA orders);
Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69, 71 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (stating "the legislative
history of CERCIA indicates that courts should not engage in premature analysis
of issues lying within the expertise of EPA, including issues as whether an emer-
gency exists and, if so, whether the particular response action is necessary and
proper").
86. 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991).
87. Id, at 1019. In Boarhead, the plaintiff owned farm property that was once
used as a burial ground by Native Americans and, as a result of such use, the prop-
erty was also eligible to be listed as a historic site. See id. at 1013. When EPA
determined that the plaintiff exposed the property to toxic waste and that pre-
cleanup studies needed to be conducted on such property, the plaintiff contended
that the Native American remains and artifacts should be protected before EPA
20
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guage of CERCLA indicates Congress intended to deny the court
jurisdiction over EPA pre-cleanup challenges even if a statute other
than CERCLA would create a federal claim.88 Other federal circuit
courts have also followed this reasoning.8 9
In Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett,90 the Second Circuit followed the
same reasoning as the Lone Pine court in declaring that it did not
have subject matter jurisdiction over an EPA order requiring plain-
tiff to undertake certain remedial actions and to develop a plan to
complete elimination of contamination. 91 The Second Circuit
conducted its studies. See id. Consequently, the plaintiff brought an action under
the Preservation Act to prohibit EPA's CERCLA-related activities on the property.
See id.
The district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, finding that it did not
meet the timing procedures for judicial review specified in CERCLA section
113(h). See id. Further, the district court concluded that "the Preservation Act did
not trump § 113(h)'s jurisdictional limitations and that any claim ... [plaintiff]
may have against the EPA... under the Preservation Act can be asserted only in
accordance with § 113[(h)]'s review procedures." Id. at 1012. Moreover, the dis-
trict court stated that under section 113(h), the plaintiff could not seek review of
EPA's removal or remedial actions until either an enforcement or cost-recovery
action was commenced under sections 106 or 107, or removal and remedial action
was completed. Se id.
88. See id The Third Circuit noted that Congress expressly granted jurisdic-
tion to all federal courts to hear claims arising under the Preservation Act. See id.
at 1016. In determining that it did not have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim,
however, the Boarhead court stated that "Congress could hardly have chosen
clearer language to express its intent generally to deprive the... court ofjurisdic-
tion over claims based on other statutes when the EPA undertakes the clean-up of
toxic wastes at a Superfund site." Id. at 1019. Further, the Boarhead court stated
that the limits of section 113(h) over the court's jurisdiction "are an integral part
of Congress's overall goal that CERCLA free the EPA to conduct forthwith dean-
up related activities at a hazardous site." Id. at 1018.
89. For a discussion of similar decisions by other federal courts, see infra
notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
90. 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986).
91. See id. at 313. In Wagner Sed, the plaintiffs warehouse, which housed
animal feed and agricultural chemicals, was burned down, causing contamination
of the surrounding properties. See id. The plaintiff immediately commenced
cleanup efforts under the supervision of the New York State Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation (NYDEC). See id. The plaintiff spent several hundred
thousand dollars and claimed to have cleaned up all neighboring properties ex-
cept two where plaintiff was denied access. See id. The plaintiff further claimed
that it requested help from EPA and the NYDEC to gain access to the properties,
but that neither could offer any assistance. See id. EPA, however, contended that
"a potentially dangerous situation existed" since several areas were still polluted
and left unprotected. Id. After several attempts to reach a satisfactory cleanup
agreement with the plaintiff, EPA issued its order pursuant to CERCLA. See id.
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed for a preliminary injunction which would prohibit
EPA's order on the grounds that the court did have subject matter jurisdiction
which, if it exercised, would have found that the plaintiff was excused from having
to undertake EPA's proposed cleanup. See id. at 313-14. The district court held
that it did not have jurisdiction to hear claims challenging EPA orders unless EPA
initiated an enforcement action under CERCLA section 104(a). See id. at 314.
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stated that, although a presumption exits favoring jurisdiction by
federal courts over federal administrative actions, under CERCLA,
"introduc[ing] the delay of court proceedings at the outset of a
cleanup would conflict with the strong congressional policy that di-
rects cleanups to occur prior to a final.determination of the partys'
[sic] rights and liabilities under CERCLA."92 In Solid State Circuits,
Inc. v. EPA,93 the Eighth Circuit also cited the Third Circuit in hold-
ing that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the merits of
an EPA cleanup prior to an attempt by EPA to enforce it. 9 4
C. Collateral Estoppel
In Johnson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc.,95 the Supreme Court
of Minnesota stated that "collateral estoppel is the 'issue preclusion'
branch of the resjudicata doctrine."96 The court further held that
collateral estoppel applies where:
(1) the issue was identical to one in a prior adjudication;
(2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the es-
topped party was a party or in privity with a party to the
prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given a
full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated
issue.97
92. Id. The Second Circuit also noted that other courts believed that "Con-
gress envisioned a procedure that permits the EPA to move expeditiously in the
face of a potential environmental disaster." Id.
93. 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987).
94. See id. at 385. In Solid Circuit, EPA, after two months of unsuccessful nego-
tiations, issued a cleanup order to the plaintiff pursuant to CERCLA section
106(a). See id. The order concluded that the plaintiff's handling of toxic sub-
stances was the cause of the contamination to the groundwater and that there was
an "'imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health, welfare, or the
environment.'" Id. Further, the order directed the plaintiff, as a responsible
party, "to obtain access to contaminated areas, to provide security at the facility, to
submit a detailed clean-up plan to the EPA, and to notify the EPA within two days
of their intent to comply with the order." Id.
Pursuant to the order, the plaintiff filed suit seeking to enjoin EPA from en-
forcing the order. See id. The plaintiff argued, inter aia, that it was not a responsi-
ble party under CERCLA and that even if it was, it could not gain access to the
contaminated site because it had no property interest in the site. See id. The dis-
trict court granted EPA's motion to dismiss on the grounds that CERCLA does not
permit the court to exercise jurisdiction over pre-enforcement orders issued by the
EPA pursuant to section 106. See id. In affirming the district court's decision, the
Eighth Circuit cited the holdings of both Wagner Seed and Meaton. See id. at 385
n.1.
95. 420 N.W.2d 608 (Minn. 1988).
96. Id. at 613 (citing Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights, 319 N.W.2d
702, 703 (Minn. 1982)).
97. Id," see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707,
711 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating same rule for collateral estoppel as used in Consoli-
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In United States v. Gurley,98 the Eighth Circuit stated that under col-
lateral estoppel "'once an issue is actually and necessarily deter-
mined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is
conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action
involving a party to the prior litigation.'" 99
dated); Bublitz v. Commissioner of Revenue, 545 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Minn. 1996)
(same); Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. 1990)
(same); Tarutis v. Commissioner of Revenue, 393 N.W.2d 667, 669 (Minn. 1986)
(same); Kaiser v. Northern States Power Co., 353 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn. 1984)
(same).
In Consolidated, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel did not preclude the plaintiffs action against a potential
tortfeasor in a wrongful death action. See Consolidated, 420 N.W.2d at 614. In an
earlier hearing, the plaintiff was found to be 20% at fault, but this was before the
defendant was identified as a potential tortfeasor. See id. Consequently, the Consol-
idated court relied on the notion that "[a]s a flexible doctrine, the focus is on
whether [collateral estoppel's] application would work an injustice on the party
against whom estoppel is urged." Id. at 613. Thus, the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply because the
defendant was not a party to the previous action, and therefore, there was serious
doubt that the plaintiff had an opportunity to fairly litigate the issue of compara-
tive fault. See id.
98. 43 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1994).
99. Id. at 1197 (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979));
see also Kaiser, 353 N.W.2d at 902 (quoting Parklane Hoisery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322, 326 n.5 (1979)) (stating "once an issue is determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a differ-
ent cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation") In Gurley, in 1983,
EPA brought an action in 1983 against Caldwell and Gurley Refining Company
(GRC) under the CWA to recover cleanup costs at a site that Caldwell and GRC
contaminated. See Gur/ey, 42 F.3d at 1191. After retaining a judgment for the
cleanup costs in 1985, EPA performed a feasibility study and additional cleanup
procedures on the contaminated site. See id. Subsequently, in 1987, EPA brought
another action to recover cleanup costs of the remedial action it adopted after the
1986 study. See id. In 1992, the trial court entered judgment for EPA, concluding
that GRC, William Gurley (principal shareholder and president of GRC), and
Larry Gurley (an employee of GRC) were jointly and severally liable for the clean-
up costs. See id. at 1192.
GRC and the Gurleys appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the district court's
judgment should be reversed because under the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
EPA was precluded by positions it took in the prior action under the CWA from
proving the defendant's liability under CERCLA. See id. at 1195. Specifically,
GRC and the Gurleys contended that: (1) EPA proved in the prior action that
GRC had disposed of "oil," therefore EPA should be precluded from proving that
CERCLA's petroleum exclusion does not apply to this cause of action and (2) EPA
should be precluded from proving that Gurleys were "operators" under CERCLA
because EPA proved that GRC was an "operator" in the prior action. See id. at
1198.
The Eighth Circuit held that the issue in the second case was not the same as
the first, thus, the argument failed to meet the first component of the test for
collateral estoppel. See id. The Eighth Circuit stated that in the first litigation, EPA
attempted to prove that GRC disposed of either "hazardous substances" or "oil" as
defined under CWA. See id. In the second case, GRC attempted to prove that it
disposed of "petroleum" as defined in CERCLA. See id. Thus, the Eighth Circuit
held that "although these two definitions may overlap to some degree, a substance
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In Graham v. Special School Distiict No. 1,100 the Supreme Court
of Minnesota stated that five factors must be satisfied to trigger col-
lateral estoppel in agency decisions:
(1) the issue to be precluded must be identical to the issue
raised in the prior agency adjudication .. .; (2) the issue
must have been necessary to the agency adjudication and
properly before the agency...; (3) the agency determina-
tion must be a final adjudication subject to judicial review
.. ; (4) the estopped party was a party or in privity with a
party to the prior agency determination .. .; (5) the es-
topped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be
heard on the adjudicated issue .... 101
In Falgren v. Board of Teaching,102 the Supreme Court of Minnesota
followed the same test it applied in Graham, but further noted that
"'[w]hether collateral estoppel is available is a mixed question of
law and fact subject to de novo review.'"10s
that is included in CWA's definition of 'oil' is not necessarily exempted from CER-
CLA's definition of 'petroleum.'" Id. at 1197. Additionally, the Eighth Circuit
held that the issue of whether GRC was an "operator" under the CWA in the first
litigation was a different and distinct question than whether the Gurleys are "oper-
ators" under CERCLA. See id.
100. 472 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1991).
101. Id. at 116. In Graham, a school board conducted a nine-day hearing and
determined, based on substantial and competent evidence, that a teacher should
be discharged. See id. at 115. During the hearing, the teacher filed a tort action
against the school board and later added an appeal to the school board's decision
to terminate her. See id. In response, the school board contended that the factual
determinations which it made in the teacher's termination proceeding were pre-
cluded from relitigation in the subsequent tort lawsuit. See id.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the school board acted in a
"quasi-judicial" capacity in handing down its decision to terminate a teacher and
thus, collateral estoppel was applicable to the agency decision. See id. at 116. The
Graham court proceeded to hold that the factual issues which arose at the termina-
tion proceeding presumably were going to arise again in the tort action and thus,
the tort action was barred by collateral estoppel. See id. Further, the Graham court
held that the teacher received a full and fair hearing because both parties were
represented by counsel, subpoenas were available, a record was made of the pro-
ceeding, and the rules of evidence were followed. See id. at 116-18.
102. 545 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1996).
103. Id. at 905 (quoting In Re Trusts Created by Hormel, 504 N.W.2d 505, 509
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993), pet. for review denied, (Minn. Oct. 19, 1993)). The Fa/gren
court also stated that while the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes parties
from relitigating issues identical to those previously litigated, it is not to be rigidly
applied. See id. In Fagrn, based on an arbitrator's factual findings, the plaintiff
was terminated by the school board for engaging in immoral conduct. The arbi-
trator concluded that the plaintiff engaged in nonconsensual sexual contact with a
student. See id. at 904.
The plaintiff then appealed the school board's decision from the Minnesota
Court of Appeals. See id. The school board argued that the plaintiff's appeal was
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The Eighth Circuit applied a similar test for determining when
collateral estoppel will bar relitigation of a factual issue in a subse-
quent hearing.104 The court stated that the factual issue at bar
must satisfy the following four part test:
(1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the same as
that involved in the prior action; (2) the issue must have
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See id. After the court of appeals
found in favor of the plaintiff, the school board appealed, at which time plaintiff
contended that only two of the five requirements for collateral estoppel were not
met, viz., the issue was not identical, nor was the agency decision subject tojudicial
review. See id. at 905. However, the Supreme Court of Minnesota found that the
issue in both instances was whether the plaintiff engaged in the alleged immoral
conduct, and thus, concluded that the issues were identical. See id. Moreover, the
Faigren court also found that under Minnesota law, an arbitrator's decision is sub-
ject to review in certain situations and thus, this decision was a final judgment
subject to review by the court. See id. Therefore, the court found that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel barred the plaintiff s appeal. See id.
104. See Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Morrison-Quirk Grain Corp., 987 F.2d 1335,
1339 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 648, 650
(Minn. 1990) (stating "collateral estoppel, sometimes referred to as issue preclu-
sion, precludes parties from relitigating issues which are identical to issues previ-
ously litigated and which were necessary and essential to the former resulting
judgment"). Farmland involved a situation in which EPA brought a CERCLA ac-
tion against Morrison Enterprises (Morrison) for past and future response costs
that EPA incurred at a contaminated site. SeeFarmland, 987 F.2d at 1337. This suit
was filed in district court in 1988 and EPA was granted partial summaryjudgment
against Morrison in 1990. See id. At the hearing, the district court determined that
Morrison owned the contaminated site during the time the hazardous waste was
released and thus, Morrison was the responsible person under CERCI.A section
107(a) (2). See id. Furthermore, the district court specifically held that its ruling
was not based on a determination that Morrison caused the contamination at the
site. See id. at 1337-38. Shortly after EPA filed suit against Morrison in 1988, Farm-
land Industries (Farmland) filed a declaratory judgment action against Morrison
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). See id. at 1338. Farmland sought a ruling that
Morrison would be liable for any response costs incurred by Farmland in connec-
tion with the investigation and cleanup of the site. See id. Morrison counter-
claimed seeking contribution and indemnity from Farmland for costs already
incurred and for any future costs incurred in connection with the cleanup of the
site. See id. After ajury ruled for Morrison on Farmland's claim and for Farmland
on Morrison's counterclaim, both appealed the decision. See id. Farmland argued
on appeal that the district court erred by not applying the collateral estoppel effect
of the decision of EPA's suit against Morrison. See id. Thus, Farmland contended
that collateral estoppel would mandate a finding that Morrison caused the contam-
ination of the site since Morrison was found to be the responsible person. See id. at
1339. Morrison argued that the district court erred in its jury instructions, thus
preventing the jury from properly considering Morrison's indemnity claim. See id.
After applying these standards, the Eighth Circuit held that since the district court
did not rule on causation in the EPA-Morrison suit, collateral estoppel could not
be applied to that issue. See id. at 1340. The Eighth Circuit, however, did hold that
collateral estoppel prevented Morrison from claiming that the release of hazard-
ous substances at the site did not occur while Morrison was an owner of the prop-
erty. See id This issue was resolved when the Morrison court found that a release
had occurred causing contamination and that Morrison was the responsible per-
son. See id.
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been litigated in the prior action; (3) the issue must have
been determined by a valid and final judgment; and (4)
the determination must have been essential to the prior
judgment. 0 5
The court also stated that "[i]f the party against whom the earlier
decision is being asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in question, collateral estoppel does not apply."' °
The Eighth Circuit has similarly held that collateral estoppel may
be raised at any time during the proceedings, "so long as it is raised
at the first reasonable opportunity after the rendering of the deci-
sion having the preclusive effect."10 7
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The Eighth Circuit's analysis of the district court's dismissal of
Gopher Oil's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction claim
was de novo.108 The court's analysis began with the DJA, which
states "that when an 'actual controversy' exists, any federal court
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party."1' 9 In determining whether there was an actual controversy
that was ripe for review under the DJA, the Gopher Oil court looked
to the following: (1) whether there was "a sufficiently concrete case
or controversy within the meaning of Article III of the Constitu-
tion"; and (2) whether "prudential considerations.. .justi[fied] the
present exercise of judicial power." 0
105. See id. The Eighth Circuit also stated that the "party asserting collateral
estoppel bears the burden of proving that a prior decision satisfies all four ele-
ments of the test." Id. at 1338.
106. Id. at 1339. See Aliff v. Joy Mfg. Co., 914 F.2d 39, 41 (4th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Southern Pac. RR. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-9 (1987) (stating "[a]
fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doc-
trines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, is that a right, question or fact dis-
tinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction ...
cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties .... ."); Amcast
Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 45 F.3d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that collat-
eral estoppel, "issue preclusion," bars relitigation in subsequent proceedings be-
tween same parties).
107. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707, 711 (8th
Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit also stated that collateral estoppel may be waived as
a defense for the first time on appeal. Id.
108. Gopher Oil Co. v. Bunker, 84 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1996).
109. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2201). For the exact language this section, see
supra note 48.
110. Id. (quoting Christopher Lake Dev. Co. v. St. Louis County, 35 F.3d 1269,
1272-73 (8th Cir. 1994)). The Eighth Circuit also stated that for an actual contro-
versy to exist there must be "'a substantial controversy between the parties having
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance
of a declaratory judgment.'" Id. (quoting Caldwell v. Gurley Ref. Co., 755 F.2d
26
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In determining that the MERLA and tort liability claims were
not ripe for review, the Eighth Circuit found that the government's
threat of suit was too speculative to create an actual controversy.111
The court also stated that withholding a decision would result in
little hardship to Gopher Oil and that the facts did not indicate an
immediate threat of either MERLA or tort liability.'12 The Eighth
Circuit, however, disagreed with the district court's decision as to
the ripeness of the CERCLA and indemnity claims."13
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by looking to the lan-
guage of CERCLA governing the timing of review." 4 The court
stated that section 9613(h) (1) "prohibits judicial review of chal-
lenges to remedial action of the EPA until after the EPA has filed
645, 649 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312
U.S. 270, 273 (1941))). The Eighth Circuit also stated that -'[a] live dispute must
exist between the parties at the time of the court's hearing.'" Id. (quoting Cald-
well v. Gurley Ref. Co., 755 F.2d 645, 650 (8th Cir. 1985)).
111. See id. at 1051. The Eighth Circuit made no independent findings on the
issues of MERLA and tort liability, but rather it agreed with the district court's
analysis finding lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. As to the issue of ripeness
on all four counts of Gopher Oil's complaint, the district court held that:
It is apparently clear that the plaintiff did receive the letter almost a full
year ago which warned it that it would be a potentially liable party. The
plaintiff then commenced this suit in expectation that it would be named
a defendant based on approximately ten months later a telephone call
warning it again. In order to bring its claim in this court, however, the
plaintiff must allege an actual controversy.
The mere possibility of being named a defendant as responsible
party does not constitute the actual controversy which is required. This
Court recognizes that [the] EPA, and the United States on its behalf, for
any number or reasons, may well and yet decline to sue Gopher Oil, or
they may select yet another among ten, or others beyond those listed as
potential defendants. They may also defer simply on the fact that this
case is too small or any one of a number of reasons, which they seem to
be able to come up with at a moment's notice and somehow the cases do
not get sued. In the event they are to be sued, those are another issue,
but this Court at this time cannot find the requisite immediacy, and in
this Court's view there is little hardship to the plaintiff in withholding the
Court's consideration.
Id. at 1049 (citing trial on defendant's motion to dismiss, appellant's addendum at
26-27).
112. Id. The Gopher Oil court did not make any independent findings on this
conclusion either, rather it relied on the district court's determination in affirming
its decision. Id.
113. Gopher Oil, 84 F.3d at 1051. Gopher Oil's complaint sought a declaration
that the Estate, as prior owners, caused the release of hazardous substances and
that Estate was liable to the extent of Gopher Oil's liability. Id. at 1049. The Es-
tate, however, argued that there was no actual controversy because Gopher Oil had
not incurred any response costs nor had the EPA brought a cost-recovery action
against Gopher Oil. Id. The Eighth Circuit never addressed the Estate's former
contention that Gopher Oil's complaint was not ripe since it had not incurred any
cleanup costs. Id.
114. Id.
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an action to recover response costs."115 The Eighth Circuit then
determined that since the EPA had initiated a cost-recovery action
pursuant to section 9607, the liability issue under CERCLA was now
ripe for review.116 The Eighth Circuit noted that while the district
court may not have had jurisdiction over the CERCLA claim at the
time of the hearing, the recent suit by the EPA created a ripe
claim."17
The Eighth Circuit then proceeded to examine Gopher Oil's
claim for indemnity from the Estate on the basis of the 1973 con-
tractual indemnity agreement between the Estate and Bame Oil.'18
In determining that the indemnity claim was ripe, the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that "the question of CERCLA liability and the interpreta-
tion of any indemnification agreement among the parties liable for
the clean-up are inextricably related." 19 After making this determi-
nation, the Eighth Circuit had to consider whether the district
court's alternative grant of summary judgment on the indemnity
issue was appropriate. 20  The Eighth Circuit stated that
"Is] ummaryjudgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dis-
pute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law."12' Since a federal court must accord "full faith and
credit" to the state court's judgment, the Eighth Circuit looked to
the law of Minnesota in making its determination.12
Under Minnesota law, collateral estoppel applies where:
(1) the issue was identical to one in a prior adjudication;
(2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the es-
115. Id. The Eighth Circuit also relied on the Fifth Circuit's determination
that "until the government initiates a cost-recovery action, a potential responsible
party cannot obtain judicial review of the agency action." Id, at 1050 (quoting Vol-
untary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1389 (5th Cir. 1989)).
116. Id. The Eighth Circuit, however, left it to the district court "to determine
whether CERCLA's objective of avoiding piecemeal litigation would be best served
if the subject matter of... [the] declaratoryjudgment action were in some way or
manner determined in conjunction with the government's cost-recovery action."
Id.
117. Id. at 1051. The Eighth Circuit proceeded to state that there may be
"significant problems" concerning the sufficiency of the CERCLA claim. Id.
118. Gopher Oi4 84 F.3d at 1051. The indemnity agreement was executed
when Bame Oil purchased Gopher State from the Romnesses. Id. For the exact
language of the indemnity agreement, see supra note 24.
119. Gopher Oi4 84 F.3d at 1051 (quoting GNB Battery Tech., Inc. v. Gould,
Inc., 65 F.3d 615, 621 (7th Cir. 1995)).
120. Id. The Eighth Circuit reviewed the summaryjudgment ruling de novo,
applying the same standard as the district court. Id.
121. Id. The Eighth Circuit adopted this standard from FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Id.
122. Id. at 1051-52.
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topped party was a party or in privity with a party to prior
adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given a full
and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated
issue.123
The Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed Gopher Oil's claim for
contractual indemnity and held that the environmental laws, from
which the current liabilities arise, were enacted ten years after the
agreement was executed, and thus, were neither contemplated by
the parties nor covered by the agreement at the time of con-
tracting.'2 4 Gopher Oil's contention in federal court, however, was
that the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruling applied only to the
MERLA liability claim under the indemnity agreement and not to
the CERCLA claim.125
Although the Eighth Circuit agreed with Gopher Oil's argu-
ment that the Minnesota state court decision did not contemplate
the CERCLA issue, the Eighth Circuit concluded, nevertheless, that
"the state court's interpretation of the indemnity agreement applies
with equal force to CERCLA liability." 2 6 Therefore, the court
stated that the phrase "existing at close" also applied to the CER-
CLA claim since CERCLA was not enacted until seven years after
the execution of the agreement.12 7 Thus, the court concluded that
summary judgment was appropriate since the intent of the indem-
nity agreement was "fully litigated" and "the issue was finally deter-
mined on its merits adversely to Gopher Oil."128
123. Id. at 1052 (quoting Johnson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 420
N.W.2d 608, 613 (Minn. 1988)). The Eighth Circuit also noted that collateral es-
toppel is a "flexible doctrine" that considers whether any injustice would result to
the party urging collateral estoppel if the doctrine were not applied. Id. (quoting
Consolidated, 420 N.W.2d at 613-14).
124. Gopher Oi, 84 F.3d at 1052. The Minnesota Court of Appeals stated that
the phrase in the indemnity agreement "existing at dosing" dearly limited Go-
pher's liability. Id.
125. See id. The Eighth Circuit also stated that it must give the state court
judgments the "same preclusive effect in federal court as they would have in state
court." Id.
126. Id. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Minnesota Court of Appeals that
the "existing at dose" language of the indemnity agreement limited Gopher State's
liability since the parties did not contemplate such liability at the time of con-
tracting. See id.
127. See id.
128. I& To summarize, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
MERLA and tort claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and affirmed the
grant of summary judgment on the indemnity agreement. See id. The Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed and remanded the dismissal of the CERCLA claim due to the cost-
recovery action filed by the EPA. See id.
1997]
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V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. The Eighth Circuit Properly Held That Gopher Oil's Liability
Claim Under CERCLA Was Ripe For Adjudication.
The overwhelming amount of authority pertaining to when a
claim is ripe for adjudication supports the Eighth Circuit's determi-
nation that the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction to
hear Gopher Oil's CERCLA liability claim. 129 Although the Eighth
Circuit came to the correct conclusion, it did not apply the proper
mode of analysis in reaching this result. The Eighth Circuit deter-
mined that because the EPA filed a cost-recovery action under CER-
CLA, the suit to determine liability between Gopher Oil and the
Estate was ripe for adjudication.' 3 0 In making this determination,
the Gopher Oil court properly stated that under Section 113(h) of
CERCLA, a court may not review any challenges to EPA remedial or
removal actions "until after the EPA has filed an action to recover
response costs."1s1 The Gopher Oil court's interpretation of this sec-
129. Gopher Oi, 84 F.3d at 1051. In reaching this conclusion, the Eighth Cir-
cuit noted that the district court may not have had subject matter jurisdiction at
the time of the hearing. See id. Thus, the Eighth Circuit did not rule definitively as
to whether the district court's determination on the CERCIA issue was correct. See
id. Rather, the Eighth Circuit analyzed the ripeness of the CERCIA issue solely in
light of the EPA's cost-recovery action. See id.
130. See id. EPA filed this cost-recovery action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
See id. For the text of 42 U.S.C. § 9607, see supra note 37. The court based this
decision on the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), which governs when judicial
review is appropriate under CERC.A. Gopher Oi/, 84 F.3d at 1051. For the text of
section 9613(h), see supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
131. See Gopher Oi4 84 F.3d at 1051 (citing CERCLA § 103, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(h)). For the text of this section, see supra notes 35-47 and accompanying
text. This conclusion is supported by Senator Thurmond's statement that "citi-
zens, including potentially responsible parties, cannot seek review of the response
action or their potential liability for a response action-other than in an action for
contribution-unless the suit falls within one of the categories provided in section
[113]." 132 CONG. REC. S14,929 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Thur-
mond). Representative Glickman further stated that "[Section 113(h)] also covers
all issues that could be construed as a challenge to the [EPA] response [actions],
and limits those challenges to the opportunities specifically set forth in this sec-
tion." 132 CoNG. REc. H9582 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Glick-
man). Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has held that section 113(h) of CERCLA
does not permit private citizens to seek an injunction to prevent the EPA from
engaging in certain removal action activities until after a removal or remedial ac-
tion has been completed by the EPA. Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of
Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 1217 (8th Cir. 1993). See also Vol-
untary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1389 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that "until the government initiates a cost-recovery action, a potential
responsible party cannot obtain judicial review of the agency action"); Carter Day
Indus., Inc. v. EPA (In re Combustion Equip. Assoc.), 838 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir.
1988) (holding plaintiff's claim against EPA not ripe for review since plaintiff was
only named as potentially responsible party and because EPA did not file claim
against plaintiff); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325,
30
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tion is supported by the Third Circuit's holding that pre-enforce-
ment review of the EPA's remedial actions was "unequivocally"
contrary to the policies underlying CERCLA. 32 Furthermore, the
plain language of Section 113(h) illustrates that the Eighth Circuit
was correct in determining that a remedial or removal action may not
be reviewed until the EPA has filed a cost-recovery action.133
Although the court was correct in its interpretation of section
113(h), this section should not have controlled the Eighth Circuit's
decision.
In determining whether Gopher Oil's claim was ripe for adju-
dication, the Eighth Circuit should have analyzed the claim under
328 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 51 (1995) (holding prohibitory language of
section 113(h) divests federal courts ofjurisdiction over any challenges to removal
or remedial actions under CERCLA); Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. EPA, 812 F.2d
383, 386 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding CERCLA does not permit court to exercise juris-
diction over pre-enforcement orders issued by EPA pursuant to CERCIA section
106).
132. Wheaton Indus. v. EPA, 781 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1986). In further
support of this conclusion, Senator Thurmond stated that "delay [in cleanup] will
often exacerbate an already serious situation . .. [and that] it is preferable to err
on the side of protecting public health, welfare and the environment in adminis-
tering the response authority of the [flund." S. RP. No. 96-848, at 56 (1980),
reprinted in A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act of 1980, at 363 (1980). Therefore, "[t]o delay remedial
action until the liability situation is unscrambled would be consistent with the stat-
utory plan to promptly eliminate the sources of danger to health and the environ-
ment." Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1985). The
Third Circuit also stated that review of the EPA's pre-enforcement activities was
contrary to CERCLA's "concerns about the danger to public health presented by
hazardous waste sites and the slow reaction by the EPA to solve the problem." Id.
Furthermore, the limits of section 113(h) on the court's jurisdiction "are an inte-
gral part of Congress's overall goal that CERCLA free the EPA to conduct forth-
with clean-up related activities at a hazardous site." Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson,
923 F.2d 1011, 1019 (3d Cir. 1991). See also Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d
310, 314 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting "Congress envisioned a procedure that permits the
EPA to move expeditiously in the face of a potential environmental disaster");
Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating "challenges to the
procedure employed in selecting a remedy nevertheless impact the implementa-
tion of the remedy and result in the same delays Congress sought to avoid by pas-
sage to the statute"); Carter Day, 838 F.2d at 37 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding purpose of
CERCLA is to cleanup toxic wastes promptly and 1986 amendments to CERCLA
show clear intent to preclude pre-enforcement judicial review).
133. SeeAlabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding plain
language of section 113(h) bars suit until a remedial action is actually completed);
see also Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1013-14 (stating plain language of CERCLA shows
Congress intended to deny court jurisdiction over EPA pre-cleanup challenges
even if statute other than CERCLA would create federal claim); Wheaton Industries,
781 F.2d at 357 (quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345
(1984)) (stating that "whether and to what extent a particular statute precludes
judicial review is determined not only from its express language, but also from the
structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the na-
ture of the administrative action involved").
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the DJA, rather than section 113(h).134 According to the court in
134. The Eighth Circuit did apply the rules of the DJA to Gopher Oil's
MERLA and tort liability claims. Gopher Oi4 84 F.3d at 1050-51. Thus, the Eighth
Circuit agreed with the district court that in regard to these two claims "the govern-
ment's threat of suit was too speculative to create an actual controversy between
Gopher Oil and the [E]state and that withholding a decision at this time would
result in little hardship to Gopher Oil." Id. at 1051. There is no debate that the
Eighth Circuit's analysis and application of the DJA was sound as to these two is-
sues, however, the Eighth Circuit did not apply this same analysis to the CERCLA
claim, as it should have. See id.
The district court's decision on whether an actual controversy existed per-
tained to all four of Gopher Oil's claims, including the CERCLA claim. See id. at
1049-50. When the Eighth Circuit analyzed the ripeness of the CERCLA claim,
however, it divorced itself from the "actual controversy" standard employed by the
district court. See id. at 1051. The Eighth Circuit specifically stated that, "given the
latest developments in the case"-namely the cost-recovery action filed by the EPA
against Gopher Oil-it disagreed with the district court's holding that the CER-
CIA and indemnity claims were not ripe. Id. The next step the Eighth Circuit
took, however, was to look to CERCLA's provisions for the timing of judicial re-
view. Id. This peculiarity, in itself, illustrates that the Eighth Circuit erroneously
employed section 113(h) of CERCLA instead of continuing to analyze the issue of
ripeness from within the "actual controversy" framework. See id.
This is supported by the district court's statement that "in the event [Gopher
Oil and the other potentially responsible parties] are to be sued, those are another
issue", but at this time the "requisite immediacy" is lacking to create an actual
controversy. Id. at 1050. Thus, as the district court indicated, once the EPA filed a
cost-recovery action, it presented "another issue" for the Eighth Circuit to analyze
under the actual controversy standard; it was not a means of getting to section
113(h) of CERCLA. See id. As noted previously, both the district court and the
Eighth Circuit found "that the government's threat of suit in this case was too
speculative to create an actual controversy". Id. at 1051. Thus, once the EPA filed
its cost-recovery against Gopher Oil, the "threat of suit" was no longer "too specula-
tive". See id. Therefore, in keeping consistent with its reasoning, the Eighth Cir-
cuit should have continued to apply the same declaratory judgment standard that
it did to the MERLA and tort claims. See id. This conclusion is also supported by
the proposition that there are two factors to consider when determining whether a
declaratory judgment action exists: (1) the fitness of the matter for judicial deci-
sion; and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding consideration. Carter Day,
838 F.2d at 37-38.
Applying this test to the facts in Gopher Oil illustrates that the district court was
using a declaratory judgment standard when it analyzed the ripeness of Gopher
Oil's claim, because the district court specifically stated "that withholding a deci-
sion at this time would result in little hardship to Gopher Oil." (emphasis added)
Gopher 014 84 F.3d at 1051. Furthermore, the district court stated that it could not
find the "requisite immediacy" necessary to create an actual controversy. Gopher
Oi. 84 F.3d at 1050. See GNB Battety, 65 F.3d at 620 (stating that to determine
whether an actual controversy exists in declaratory judgment context there must
be "a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of suf-
ficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment").
Thus, since the district court applied a declaratory judgment test to all of Gopher
Oil's claims, the Eighth Circuit should have done the same. See Gopher O4 84 F.3d
at 1050. Furthermore, when one considers, both, that the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the district court's ripeness determination as to the MERLA and the tort liability
issues, and that the district court's decision was made in reference to all of Gopher
Oil's claims, it seems difficult to understand how the Eighth Circuit could abandon
a mode of analysis that it partly affirmed and instead look to CERCLA's timing
provisions for judicial review of challenges made to EPA removal and remedial
32
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Arawana Mills Co. v. United Technologies Corp.,13 5 ripeness "controls
only those cases in which the EPA has engaged in enforcement ac-
tion under CERCLA and one of the potentially responsible parties
which the EPA has identified files a suit asking for a declaratory
judgment that it is not liable."136 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has
held that the absence of EPA enforcement actions does not render a
CERCLA claim "remote" or "hypothetical". 
3 7
In Gopher Oil, Gopher Oil's complaint sought a declaration that
the Estate was a responsible party under CERCLA to the extent of
Gopher Oil's liability; the complaint did not, however, challenge
the EPA's determination that Gopher Oil was a potentially responsi-
ble party. s8 Therefore, the Gopher Oil court did not have to wait for
EPA to engage in enforcement action, namely a cost-recovery ac-
tion, prior to determining that Gopher Oil's claim was ripe.' 3 9
Moreover, since Gopher Oil's claim was a private cause of action
actions. See id. at 1051. It does not seem logical for the Eighth Circuit to partly
affirm a district court decision-a decision that specifically analyzed the ripeness
of the CERCLA issue without looking to Section 113(h)-and at the same time
apply an independent standard without stating the reasons for its divergence from
the standard it previously affirmed. See id. See also Carter Day, 838 F.2d at 37 (stat-
ing that the purpose of the DJA is to enable parties to adjudicate disputes before
either side suffers great damage).
135. 795 F. Supp. 1238 (D. Conn. 1992).
136. Id. at 1247. In Arawana, the District Court for Connecticut found that a
private plaintiffs motion for declaratory judgment that defendant was liable for
cleanup and future costs was ripe. Id, In coming to this conclusion, the Arawana
court looked to the dispute between the private parties to determine whether the
claim was ripe, not to whether CERCLA's timing provisions for judicial review were
invoked. See id.
137. Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 893 (9th Cir.
1986). The Ninth Circuit specifically reversed the district court's holding that "an
authorized governmental cleanup program, initiated by the EPA or by state au-
thorities pursuant to a cooperative agreement, must commence before a private
party can state a claim for damages under CERCLA." Id. at 890 (quoting Wickland
Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 72, 77 (N.D. Cal. 1984)).
138. See Gopher Oi4 84 F.3d at 1049. See aLso Allied Princess Bay Co. v.
Atochem N. Am., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 595, 602 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating CERCILA
specifically provides for private cause of action even where extent of response costs
are uncertain, remediation has yet to occur, and the plaintiff is as yet under no
government order compelling remediation).
139. See Gopher Oi4 84 F.3d at 1051. The Eighth Circuit based its ripeness
determination solely on the fact that EPA had filed a cost-recovery action against
Gopher Oil. Id. Thus, the Eighth Circuit analyzed whether Gopher Oil's CERCLA
claim was ripe for review based on the judicial review provisions of section 113(h).
Id. This section, however, should not have applied since Gopher Oil's claim was
against another private party, namely the Estate, and not a claim against the EPA.
See id. See also Caldwell v. Gurley Ref. Co., 755 F.2d 645, 650 (8th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that lessor's declaratory judgment action against lessee to determine CERCLA
liability was ripe even though EPA had not filed cost-recovery action against either
party). While the Ca/dwe/ court analyzed whether there was an "actual contro-
versy" between private parties, it did not look at the timing requirements for judi-
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against the Estate and not the EPA, the Eighth Circuit should have
determined whether an "actual controversy" existed under the DJA
to allow the court to have subject matter jurisdiction.140
To determine whether an actual controversy exists in a declara-
tory judgment context, there must be "a substantial controversy, be-
tween parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy
and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." 141
Gopher Oil's complaint presented a "substantial controversy" since
it involved a private cause of action which sought a court determi-
nation of which party was liable under CERCLA as between itself
and the Estate. 142 The claim also had "sufficient immediacy" be-
cial review under CERCA. Id. For a further discussion of Caldwell see supra note
49 and accompanying text.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Under this section of the DJA, once the court has
determined that an actual controversy exists, it may determine the rights of the
parties seeking the declaration and "whether or not further relief is or could be
sought." Id, In order for section 113(h) of CERCLA to apply, Gopher Oil would
have had to bring suit against the EPA challenging one of its removal or remedial
orders, as this section provides that the court shall not have "jurisdiction to review
any challenges of remedial or removal actions" except in the enumerated in-
stances. See CERCLA § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). For the full text of Section
113(h), see supra notes 35-47. Since Gopher Oil did not challenge either an EPA
remedial action or a removal action, section 113(h) was rendered moot, and thus,
the Eighth Circuit could determine the rights of the parties once an actual contro-
versy was presented. See Gopher Oi, 84 F.3d at 1051. The cases involving the appli-
cability of section 113(h) illustrate that it is not invoked unless the EPA action is
implicated or challenged in the lawsuit. In Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas De-
partment of Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 1216-17 (8th Cir.
1993), the Eighth Circuit stated that section 113(h) of CERCLA does not grant
jurisdiction to the courts until after removal and remedial actions have been com-
pleted by EPA. In Peace Center, the Eighth Circuit held that it did not have jurisdic-
tion over an action by private citizens who sought a preliminary injunction to
prevent EPA from engaging in removal action activities which the citizens op-
posed. Id. at 1218. For a further discussion of the facts of Peace Center, see supra
notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
141. GNB Battery, 65 F.3d at 620 (quoting Nuclear Eng'g Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d
241, 251-52 (7th Cir. 1981)). Applying this standard, the GNB Battery court held
that there was a justiciable controversy when a plaintiff filed a declaratory judg-
ment action in anticipation of a threatened action by the defendant. Id. Specifi-
cally, the GNB Battery court held that, looking at the totality of circumstances,
plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that defendant sought to impose CERCLA liability
on it, thereby creating an actual controversy. Id. at 621. For the facts of GNB
Battery, see supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
142. See Gopher Oi4 84 F.3d at 1049-50. In GNB Battery, the plaintiff sought a
declaration that: (1) defendant was liable to plaintiff under CERCLA; and (2) that
defendant was responsible for plaintiff's environmental liabilities on the basis of an
agreement between the parties. See GNB Battery, 65 F.3d at 618-19. These facts
rival those in Gopher Oi4 as Gopher Oil sought both a declaration that the Estate
was liable for Gopher Oil's CERCLA liability and that the Estate was required to
indemnify Gopher Oil for any liabilities arising under CERCLA. See Gopher O4 84
F.3d at 1049. Thus, since the court in GNB Battery held that "the question of CER-
CLA liability and the interpretation of any indemnification agreement among the
parties liable for the clean-up are inextricably related," Gopher Oil's complaint
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cause the EPA had threatened to sue Gopher Oil for cleanup costs
in the near future and it was necessary to get a determination as to
whether Gopher Oil or the Estate would be liable to EPA for these
costs.' 4 3 There were also "adverse legal interests" present, since
neither party could agree as to who was liable for the cleanup costs
under CERCLA.1 4
Furthermore, according to the Ninth Circuit, "a case is ripe
where the essential facts establishing the right to declaratory relief
must have presented a "substantial controversy". See ONB Battey, 65 F.3d at 619.
This invariably holds true when one considers that since the Eighth Circuit enter-
tained the merits of the "inextricably related" indemnity claim, they must have
determined that there was at least a "substantial controversy" with respect to the
indemnity agreement. See Gopher O/ 84 F.3d at 1051. Therefore, since the CER-
CLA claim and the indemnity cannot be separated under the analysis set forth in
GNB Battery, there must have been a "substantial controversy" in regard to Gopher
Oil's CERCLA claim as well. This is supported by Allied Princess Bay Co. v.
Atochem North America, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 595, 602 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), in which the
court stated that CERCLA specifically provides for a private cause of action even
when the extent of the response costs are uncertain, remediation has yet to occur,
and the plaintiff is as yet under no government order compelling remediation.
143. See Gopher O 84 F.3d at 1049-50. The "immediacy" of Gopher Oil's
claim is compounded by the fact that a representative from the EPA informed
Gopher Oil that the EPA anticipated referring this matter to the Department of
Justice and expected a CERC.A suit to be brought in the first quarter of 1995. See
id. at 1049. The fact that the EPA did eventually file a cost-recovery action against
Gopher Oil lends more support to the immediacy argument, since Gopher Oil
specifically attempted to divert liability by filing its action against the Estate. See id.
Furthermore, the immediacy of Gopher Oil's claim is apparent when one consid-
ers that CERCLA liability will continue to exist even if contractual liability is deter-
mined to be non-existent. See GNB Battery, 65 F.3d at 621 (noting that the issues of
CERCLA liability and contractual liability are "inextricably" interrelated). Thus,
the Eighth Circuit could entertain subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that
it had to determine liability for the purposes of CERCIA liability if for no other
reason. This is supported by the court's reasoning in GNB Battery, that the "totality
of circumstances" test can be used to determine whether a claim creates an actual
controversy. See id. at 620. Following the GNB Battery court's reasoning, the "total-
ity of circumstances" in Gopher Oil suggest that the claim is ripe: the initial threat
of suit by the EPA, the naming of Gopher Oil as a potentially responsible party;, the
cost-recovery action by the EPA against Gopher Oil; and the indemnity agreement
between the parties. See Gopher Oij/ 84 F.3d at 1049-50. The GAM Battery court
stated that when "a declaratory judgment plaintiff files an action in anticipation of
a threatened action by the declaratory judgment defendant, the real and immedi-
ate possibility of such litigation is sufficient to create a justiciable controversy."
GNB Battery, 65 F.3d at 620. But see Gopher Oi4 84 F.3d at 1049-50 (district court
decision, which was partly affirmed by Eighth Circuit, stated that merely being
named potentially responsible party does not present requisite immediacy re-
quired to constitute an actual controversy).
144. See Gopher Oi/ 84 F.3d at 1049-50. The "adverse legal interests" between
the parties are best evidenced by the debate over the interpretation of the indem-
nity agreement. See id. at 1051. Gopher Oil argued that the indemnity agreement
encompassed all liabilities arising from the day the agreement was entered into by
the parties. See id. The Estate, whose position was adopted by the court, however,
contended that the indemnity agreement did not contemplate environmental laws
enacted years after the agreement was executed. See id.
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have already occurred." 145 In Gopher Oil the "essential fact" estab-
lishing Gopher Oil's right to declaratory relief occurred when the
Brooklyn Park site was contaminated and the EPA demanded reim-
bursement for the entire cost of its cleanup efforts from Gopher Oil
and nine other potentially responsible parties.146 Thus, after being
named a potentially responsible party, Gopher Oil did not have to
wait for the EPA to file a cost-recovery action before it could insti-
tute a CERGLA liability claim against the Estate. 147 Therefore, the
145. Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 893 (9th Cir.
1986). In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit held that a successor owner's
claim that a previous owner was solely and entirely responsible under CERCIA for
the release of all hazardous substances was ripe for review even though the EPA
had not engaged in any enforcement action against the successor owner. See id.
The Ninth Circuit held that the essential fact establishing the successor owner's
right to declaratory relief was the alleged disposal of hazardous substances at the
contaminated site at the time the previous owner occupied the site. See id For a
further discussion of the facts in Wwkland Oi, see supra notes 55-57 and accompa-
nying text.
146. Gopher Oi4 84 F.3d at 1049. Applying the "essential fact" standard set
forth in Wwldand Oil illustrates that Gopher Oil's situation was analogous to that of
the plaintiff in Wkland Oil and, therefore, should have been ripe. See Wkand
O 792 F.2d at 893. In Wwukand Oil the plaintiff specifically requested a declara-
tion that the defendant, rather than itself, was solely liable under CERCLA for any
release of the hazardous substances at the contaminated site. See id. at 889. This
declaration was filed prior to any enforcement action by the EPA, but after plain-
tiff had incurred some cleanup costs. See id. Count one of Gopher Oil's com-
plaint, which was also filed prior to EPA enforcement action, was almost identical
to the plaintiff's request in Wwckand Oil in that it alleged that the Estate was a
responsible party under CERCILA to the extent of Gopher Oil's liability. See Gopher
Oi4 84 F.3d at 1049. Furthermore, the "essential fact" in Wddand Oi4 the alleged
disposal of hazardous substances at the contaminated site when it was owned by
defendant, was very similar to the situation in Gopher OiL See id. Although Gopher
Oil did not involve a piece of property once owned by the Estate, it did involve a
declaration that the Estate, as predecessor corporation, actually caused the release
of the hazardous substances at Brooklyn Park and therefore was liable under CER-
CLA for cleanup costs. Id. This correlation illustrates that Gopher Oil's complaint
was ripe for review because the "essential fact," namely the contamination at the
Brooklyn Park site coupled with potential CERCLA liability, had already occurred
when Gopher Oil filed its action. See Gopher Oil 84 F.3d at 1049-50.
Furthermore, just because Gopher Oil did not expend any cleanup costs does
not render Gopher Oil's claim unripe, since the "occurrence of the contamina-
tion" was the "essential fact" establishing the right to declaratory relief, not the
expenditure of cleanup costs. Sw id. Thus, applying the standards set forth in
Wickland Oil the Eighth Circuit could determine that an actual controversy existed
between Gopher Oil and the Estate.
147. See Caldwell v. Gurley Ref. Co., 755 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1985). The Cald-
weU court held that there was an actual controversy between a lessor and lessee to
warrant a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of lessor's right to
indemnity against lessee for liability arising under CERCLA. See id, at 650. The
Caidwel court made this ruling even though the EPA had not filed a cost-recovery
action against either party. See id. Prior to the lawsuit, however, the Coast Guard
notified the parties that one, or both of the parties, would be liable for the EPA's
cleanup costs. See id. Based on these facts, the Eighth Circuit found that there was
a "live dispute" between the parties. Id For a discussion of the facts of Caidweil
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Eighth Circuit should have focused its analysis on the ripeness of
Gopher Oil's claim under the DJA, not on whether Gopher Oil's
claim met the provisions of Section 113(h).148
Moreover, this conclusion is also supported by the spirit of
CERCLA, which contains an express cause of action for contribu-
tion under section 9613 and "impliedly authorize[s] a similar and
somewhat overlapping remedy in [section 9607]. "149 In Kelley v.
Thomas Solvent Co.,'- ° the District Court for the Western District of
Michigan held that section 9607 creates a private cause of action
and that allowing such a cause of action "encourages subsequent
owners and occupiers to take prompt response actions when haz-
ardous contamination is discovered and thus, minimizes harm."151
Although Gopher Oil's complaint did not seek contribution under
section 9607, it did seek a private cause of action attempting to hold
the Estate liable to the extent of Gopher Oil's CERCLA liability.' 52
Thus, Gopher Oil's claim to redistribute liability is similar in spirit
to a private cause of action for reimbursement and contribution in
that none of these causes of action run counter to CERCLA's goal
of allowing the EPA to conduct cleanup activities at hazardous
waste sites.155 This holds true because none of these causes of ac-
see supra note 49 and accompanying text. See also GNB Battery Technologies, Inc.
v. Gould, Inc., 65 F.3d 615, 620 (7th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of GNB Battery,
see supra notes 64-66 & 144.
148. See Arawana Mills Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238,
1247 (D. Conn. 1992) (stating that ripeness "controls only those cases in which the
EPA has engaged in enforcement action under CERCILA and one of the poten-
tially responsible parties which the EPA has identified files a suit asking for a de-
claratory judgment that it is not liable").
149. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994). The perti-
nent part of section 9607(a) of CERCJLA provides that liability extends to "any
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan." CERCILA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B). For the
text of section 9607, see supra note 37. Section 9613(f) of CERCLA provides, in
pertinent part, that "[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person
who is liable or potentially liable under 9607(a) of [CERCLA], during or following
any civil action under section 9606 of [CERCLA] or under section 9607(a) of
[CERCLA].- CERCIA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
150. 790 F. Supp. 710 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
151. Id. at 717. For a discussion of the facts in Kd/ey, see supra notes 61 and
accompanying text. See also NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir.
1986) (concluding that section 9607 permits private cause of action to recover
cleanup costs even though plaintiff incurred its cleanup costs without acting pursu-
ant to cleanup program approved by "lead agency."). For a discussion of the facts
of NL Industries, see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
152. Gopher Oil Co. v Bunker, 84 F.3d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir. 1996).
153. See Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1019 (3d Cir. 1991) (stat-
ing limits of section 113(h) on court's jurisdiction "are an integral part of Con-
gress's overall goal that CERCLA free the EPA to conduct forthwith clean-up
related activities at a hazardous site")
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tion challenge any action taken by the EPA, thus no delay results in
remedial or removal actions since these suits only involve private
parties.'5
B. The Eighth Circuit Properly Concluded That Collateral
Estoppel Barred Gopher Oil's CERCLA Claim In
Federal Court.
In Gopher Oil, the Eighth Circuit had to determine whether Go-
pher Oil's contractual indemnity claim under CERCLA was barred
by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 155 For collateral estoppel to
apply, the four previously mentioned factors must be satisfied. 156
Even if these criteria are met, however, the Eighth Circuit still had
to focus on whether the application of collateral estoppel would
work an injustice against Gopher Oil since collateral estoppel is a
"flexible doctrine."157 Applying these standards, the Gopher Oil
154. See Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1388 (5th
Cir. 1989) (stating "it is dear that CERCLA explicitly limits judicial review of reme-
dial and removal plans where such review will delay cleanup").
155. Gopher Oil, 84 F.3d at 1051-52. The debated contractual provision reads
"[a]ll liabilities of the Company of any nature, whether accrued, absolute, contin-
gent, or otherwise, existing at closing, to the extent not reflected or reserved against
in full in the Company's financial statements or otherwise mentioned or expected
herein .. . arising out of transactions entered into, or any state of facts existing
prior to such date." (emphasis added). State v. Gopher Oil Co., No. C8-94-225,
1994 WL 328631, *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 12, 1994). For further discussion of the
Minnesota Court of Appeals' analysis of the indemnity agreement, see supra notes
24-28 and accompanying text.
156. For a list of the four factors needed for collateral estoppel to apply, see
supra text accompanying note 97. SeeJohnson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc.,
420 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Minn. 1988); See also Tarutis v. Commissioner of Revenue,
393 N.W.2d 667, 669 (Minn. 1986) (stating same rule for collateral estoppel as
used in Consolidated); Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 648, 650(Minn. 1990) (same); Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 968
F.2d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 1992) (same); Bublitz v. Commissioner of Revenue, 545
N.W.2d 382, 385 (Minn. 1996) (same); Farmland Industries, Inc. v. Morrison-
Quirk Grain Corp., 987 F.2d 1335, 1339 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating collateral estoppel
applies when factual issue at bar meets four part test: "(1) the issue sought to be
precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) the issue must
have been litigated in the prior action; (3) the issue must have been determined by
a valid and final judgment; and (4) the determination must have been essential to
the prior judgment"); Graham v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 472 N.W.2d 114, 116
(Minn. 1991) (stating additional factor must be met to trigger collateral estoppel
to ageny decisions: "the agency determination must be a final adjudication subject
to judicial review") The Eighth Circuit accorded full faith and credit to the Minne-
sota court's decision, giving it the same preclusive effect in federal court as it
would have in a Minnesota state court. Gopher Oil 84 F.3d at 1051-52. Thus, the
Eighth Circuit looked to Minnesota law to determine the preclusive effect of the
state court's decision. Id. at 1052.
157. See Consolidated, 420 N.W.2d at 613-14. In Consolidated, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota combined this standard with the four collateral estoppel ele-
ments to determine that although plaintiff had fully litigated a tort action in a
38
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss2/7
1997] BUNKER 593
court found that although the CERCLA liability issue was not raised
in state court, the state court's interpretation of the indemnity
agreement applied with equal force to CERCLA liability. 158 More-
over, since collateral estoppel "is a mixed question of law and fact
subject to de novo review," the Gopher Oil court had to apply this
standard when reviewing the district court's decision. 159
The Eighth Circuit's determination that collateral estoppel
barred Gopher Oil's claim was correct. The Estate raised the issue
of collateral estoppel "at the first reasonable opportunity after the
rendering of the decision having the preclusive effect," thus the
Eighth Circuit was justified in entertaining the Estate's collateral
estoppel defense.' 60 Applying the first criteria necessary for collat-
eral estoppel illustrates that the language in the indemnity agree-
ment which Gopher Oil attempted to apply to the CERCLA claim
was identical to the MERLA claim asserted at the state level.16' The
different proceeding, collateral estoppel did not bar his claim against a later dis-
covered potential tortfeasor. See id. The Consolidated court stated that plaintiff did
not have an opportunity to fairly litigate in the earlier action because the defend-
ant had not been identified as a potential tortfeasor. See id. Thus, although the
issue of fault in the tort action was litigated earlier it was not done to its fullest
extent. See id.
158. Gopher Oil, 84 F.3d at 1052. The Eighth Circuit followed the Minnesota
Court of Appeals' reasoning that "[t] he liabilities at issue in this case arise under
environmental laws enacted ten years after the [indemnity] agreement was exe-
cuted. They were neither contemplated by the parties nor covered by the agree-
ment. The qualifying phrase 'existing at closing' clearly limits Gopher State's
liability." Id. (quoting State v. Gopher Oil Co., No. C8-94-225, 1994 WL 328631,
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 12, 1994)).
159. See Falgren v. Board of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn. 1996)
(quoting In Re Trusts Created by Hormel, 504 N.W.2d 505, 509 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993), pet. for review denied, (Minn. Oct. 19, 1993)) (stating that while collateral
estoppel precludes parties from relitigating issues identical to those previously liti-
gated, it is not applied rigidly). For a discussion of the facts in Falgrern, see supra
notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
160. SeeAetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707, 711
(8th Cir. 1992) (setting forth notion that collateral estoppel may be raised at any
time during proceedings "so long as it is raised at the first reasonable opportunity
after the decision having the preclusive effect"). In Gopher Oil, the Estate raised
the issue of collateral estoppel during proceedings at the district court level. See
Gopher Oil, 84 F.3d at 1051. This was the first opportunity the Estate had to raise
the issue of collateral estoppel at the federal level, because all of Gopher Oil's
claims pertaining to the Brooklyn Park site were raised initially in federal court.
See id. Thus, the Brooklyn Park litigation presented the first opportunity for the
Estate to rely on the findings of the Minnesota state courts in the earlier liability
action. See id.
161. See Gopher Oil, 84 F.3d at 1052. When Bame Oil (which later became
Gopher Oil) acquired Gopher State from the Romnesses, the Romnesses agreed to
indemnify Bame with respect to any of Gopher State's liabilities existing at closing.
Id. at 1049. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that "the qualifying phrase 'ex-
isting at closing' clearly limits Gopher State's liability." Id. at 1052. See also Falgren,
545 N.W.2d at 905 (holding that where teacher was terminated for engaging in
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decision by the Minnesota Court of Appeals supports the Eighth
Circuit's conclusion that "[t]he intent of the indemnity agreement
with regard to later enacted environmental laws is the identical is-
sue that was fully litigated by Gopher Oil in the state court third-
party complaint, and the issue was finally determined on its merits
adversely to Gopher Oil."162
Gopher Oil's claim also satisfied the second element of collat-
eral estoppel since the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals
of Minnesota pertaining to contractual liability was a "final judg-
ment on the merits."163 The third criteria was also satisfied since
both Gopher Oil and the Estate were parties to the prior adjudica-
immoral conduct and Board of Teaching revoked his license for engaging in same
immoral conduct based on same factual findings, issue sought to be precluded in
the agency hearing was identical to issue decided in termination proceeding for
collateral estoppel purposes). For a discussion of the facts in Falgren, see supra
note 102-03 and accompanying text. In Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Morrison-Quirk
Grain Corp., 987 F.2d 1335, 1339 (8th Cir. 1993), the Eighth Circuit held that a
determination in a prior CERCLA action by the EPA that the former owner of a
hazardous waste site was a responsible person, did not have a collateral estoppel
effect in the subsequent action brought by the current owner seeking contribution
or indemnity for expenses incurred as a result of the contamination. The Eighth
Circuit ruled, however, that collateral estoppel prevented a former owner from
claiming that a release did not occur at the facility while he was the owner or
operator at that site. See id. For a discussion of the facts of Farmland, see supra
notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
162. Gopher Oil, 84 F.3d at 1052. Gopher Oil contended that the Minnesota
Court of Appeals' ruling on the indemnity agreement applied only to the MERLA
claim and not to the CERCLA claim. See id. Although the Eighth Circuit agreed
with Gopher Oil's argument, it nevertheless stated that the issue pertaining to the
CERCLA claim was identical to the issue pertaining to the MERILA claim which was
adjudicated at the state court level. See id. See United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d
1188, 1198 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating collateral estoppel did not bar EPA's suit
against waste oil reclamation company since issues in present cause of action were
not identical to those in an earlier action against defendant). The Gurey court
held that the earlier action involved both whether a substance disposed of was "oil"
as defined in the CWA and whether defendant was an "operator" under the CWA.
See id. at 1198-99. The subsequent EPA action, however, concerned both whether
a substance was "petroleum" under CERCLA and whether defendant was an "oper-
ator" under CERCLA. See id. at 1198. The Gury court found that, although these
definitions were closely related, they did not comprise the same issue. See id For a
further discussion of Gurey, see supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
163. See Gopher O/4 84 F.3d at 1052. See a/soJohnson v. Consolidated Freight-
ways, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Minn. 1988) (stating second element of when
collateral estoppel applies is where "there was a final judgment on the merits");
State v. Gopher Oil Co., No. C8-94-225, 1994 WL 328631, *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July
12, 1994) (setting forth decision on Gopher Oil's contractual indemnity claim);
Kaiser v. Northern State Power Co., 353 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn. 1984) (quoting
Parklane Hoisery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5 (1979) (stating "once an
issue is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is
conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party
to the prior litigation").
40
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss2/7
1997] BUNKER 595
tion. 164 Moreover, by determining that the language of the indem-
nity agreement limited the Estate's liability to all liabilities "existing
at closing," the state court gave Gopher Oil a "full and fair" oppor-
tunity to adjudicate the contractual indemnity issue. 165 Finally,
since each of these factors were met, Gopher Oil would not suffer
injustice by invoking collateral estoppel against its indemnity
claim. 66 Thus, the Eighth Circuit properly concluded that collat-
eral estoppel barred Gopher Oil's contractual indemnity claim
under CERCLA in the federal courts.
VI. IMPACT
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Gopher Oil will have a negative
impact on future cases that involve a private party declaratory judg-
ment action against another private party seeking a declaration that
the former is not liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA.167 This
holds true even though the Eighth Circuit ultimately reached the
correct conclusion as to the ripeness issue. By applying section
113(h) of CERCIA to Gopher Oil's CERCLA liability claim, the
Eighth Circuit essentially divorced itself from the actual controversy
164. SeeJohnson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 608, 613 (stat-
ing third element of when collateral estoppel applies is where "the estopped party
was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication"); State v. Gopher Oil
Co., No. C8-94-225, 1994 WL 328631, *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 12, 1994) (showing
Gopher Oil denied any liability and served third-party complaint against Estate
alleging that Estate must indemnify it for any environmental liability).
165. See Consolidated, 420 N.W.2d at 613 (stating fourth element of collateral
estoppel is where "the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be
heard on the adjudicated issue"). The Minnesota Court of Appeals set forth the
proposition that whether the indemnity agreement was ambiguous was a legal de-
termination for the court to decide. See State v. Gopher Oil Co., No. C8-94-225,
1994 WL 328631, *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 12, 1994). After reviewing the agree-
ment, the appellate court held that neither party contemplated liabilities arising
under environmental laws enacted ten years after the agreement. See id. Accord-
ing full faith and credit to the state court decision, the Eighth Circuit found that
the same analysis applied to the CERCLA claim since CERCLA was enacted seven
years after the indemnity agreement. See Gopher Oi4 84 F.3d at 1051-52. Thus,
Gopher Oil received a "full and fair opportunity" to have the indemnity issue liti-
gated. See Graham v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 472 N.W.2d 114, 116-18 (Minn.
1991) (holding teacher received full and fair hearing where both parties where
represented by counsel; subpoenas were available; record was made of the pro-
ceedings; and rules of evidence were followed at proceeding to determine whether
teacher should be discharged). For a discussion of the facts of Graham, see supra
notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
166. See Conso/idated, 420 N.W.2d at 613-14 (stating "[als a flexible doctrine,
the focus is on whether [collateral estoppel's] application would work an injustice
on the party against whom estoppel is urged.").
167. As to the collateral estoppel issue, the Eighth Circuit's holding was accu-
rate under Minnesota law and, therefore, its decision will not adversely impact
future cases involving collateral estoppel.
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standard applied by other courts in a like situation. 168 Thus, private
parties bringing CERCLA liability claims in the Eighth Circuit will
no longer be subject to the requirements of the DJA, rather, they
will have to satisfy the requirements of section 113(h) before they
can obtain a declaratory judgment.169
Therefore, from a practical standpoint, where EPA decides
against engaging in an enforcement action that would invoke fed-
eral jurisdiction under section 113(h), a private party will not be
able to get a declaration assessing CERCLA liability in the Eighth
Circuit.1 70 The negative implications that this scenario produces
are endless, but perhaps the most compelling is a situation in which
a private party engages in voluntary cleanup, thereby incurring
costs, and subsequently seeks a declaration that another party
should be required to indemnify it for its cleanup costs under CER-
CLA. 171 This scenario obviously creates not only a difficult situa-
168. See Gopher Oil Co. v Bunker, 84 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 1996). For a
discussion of how the Eighth Circuit diverged from the "actual controversy" stan-
dard set forth in the DJA and applied by other courts see supra notes 129-54 and
accompanying text.
169. This result is very difficult to rationalize when one considers that section
113(h) applies to judicial review of removal and remedial actions by the EPA, not
whether a claim presents an "actual controversy" under the DJA. See CERCIA
§ 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). This is illustrated by section 113(h) which states
that federal court jurisdiction to review any challenges of remedial or removal ac-
tions is limited to five specific instances, including "(1) an action under section
9607 of [CERCLA] for recovery of response costs or damages or contribution .... "
Id. Therefore, in causes of action similar to that in Gopher Oil, a party will have to
wait for the EPA to file an action against it before it can get a declaration that it
should not be liable for cleanup costs. See Gopher Oil, 84 F.3d at 1051. Thus, the
Eighth Circuit's analysis conflicts with the DJA's purpose of enabling "parties to
adjudicate disputes before either side suffers great damage." Carter Day Indus.,
Inc. v. EPA (In re Combustion Equip. Assoc.), 838 F.3d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1988).
170. See Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1389 (5th
Cir. 1989) (holding "until the government initiates a cost-recovery action, a poten-
tial responsible party cannot obtain judicial review of the agency action."); see also
Carter Day, 838 F.2d at 38 (holding plaintiff's claim against EPA was not ripe for
review since plaintiff was only named as potentially responsible party and because
EPA did not file claim against plaintiff); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v.
Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 328-29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 51 (1995) (holding
prohibitory language of section 113(h) divests federal courts of jurisdiction over
any challenges to removal or remedial actions under CERCIA); Solid State Cir-
cuits, Inc. v. EPA, 812 F.2d 383, 385-86 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding CERCLA does not
permit court to exercise jurisdiction over pre-enforcement orders issued by EPA
pursuant to section 106 of CERCLA). For a further discussion of the application
of section 113(h) of CERCLA, see supra notes 35-94 and accompanying text.
171. This situation has been presented before the federal courts in many in-
stances and, in each case, the court has analyzed the claim under an "actual con-
troversy" standard. See Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding successor owner's claim against previous owner to determine
liability under CERCLA was ripe even though EPA had not filed an action against
either party); Arawana Mills Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238,
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non for parties who acquire cleanup costs under CERCLA, but also
poses a difficult decision for parties in deciding whether to volunta-
rily cleanup hazardous waste sites. 172 Therefore, the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision in Gopher Oil may produce inequitable results,
dissuade parties from cleanup contributions, and leave private par-
ties without a proper course of action in future CERCLA liability
lawsuits.
David M. Cessante
1245-46 (D. Conn. 1992) (holding private plaintiffs motion for declaratory judg-
ment that defendant was liable for cleanup and future costs was ripe); Allied Prin-
cess Bay Co. v. Atochem N. Am., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 595, 602-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(stating CERCLA specifically provides for private cause of action even when extent
of response costs are uncertain, remediation has yet to occur, and plaintiff is as yet
under no government order compelling remediation); GNB Battery Technologies,
Inc. v. Gould, Inc., 65 F.3d 615, 620 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that when declaratory
judgment plaintiff filed "an action in anticipation of a threatened action by [a]
declaratory judgment defendant, the real and immediate possibility of... litiga-
tion [was] sufficient to create ajusticiable controversy"). For a further discussion
of these cases, see supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
172. Parties may be reluctant to voluntarily cleanup waste sites if they are not
assured a proper course of action in federal courts. Furthermore, the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision conflicts with CERCLA's theory of providing restitution to parties by
making those parties responsible for causing hazardous substances releases liable
for cleanup costs. SeeJohn C. Cruden, Environmental Litigation, SA85 ALI-ABA 517,
519-21 (1996).
1997]
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